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Democratic theory presupposes open channels of dialogue, but focuses 
almost exclusively on matters of institutional design writ large.  The 
philosophy of language explicates linguistic infrastructure, but often avoids 
exploring the political significance of its findings.  In this Article, Professor 
Tsai draws from the two disciplines to reach new insights about the 
democracy-enhancing qualities of popular constitutional language.  
Employing examples from the founding era, the struggle for black civil rights, 
the religious awakening of the last two decades, and the search for gay 
equality, he presents a model of constitutional dialogue that emphasizes 
common modalities and mobilized vernacular. 
According to this model, metaphors, metonyms, and other idioms serve as 
integral features of democratic institution-building.  An especially resonant 
metaphor spreads democratic ideology efficiently and aggressively.  The 
composition helps to create the appearance of political rule as continuous and 
timeless.  It also renders law accountable to the people – by reestablishing the 
terms of community through this language device in the course of litigation 
and public debate, ordinary citizens can redirect the very path of higher law.  
In short, popular language legitimates constitutional regimes and builds 
support among the people themselves. 
INTRODUCTION: A PLACE FOR THE FIGURATIVE IN A REPUBLIC 
  I. 
Come muster, my Lads, your mechanical Tools, 
Your Saws and your Axes, your Hammers and Rules; 
Bring your Mallets and Planes, your Level and Line, 
And Plenty of Pins of American Pine; 
 For our Roof we will raise, and our Song still shall be – 
 A Government firm, and our Citizens free. 
 
 II. 
Come, up with the Plates, lay them firm on the Wall, 
Like the People at large, they’re the Ground-work of all; 
Examine them well, and see that they’re sound, 
Let no rotten Parts in our Building be found; 
 For our Roof we will raise, and our Song still shall be – 
 Our Government firm, and our Citizens free. 
. . . . 
                        V. 
Our King-Posts are Judges – how upright they stand, 
Supporting the Braces, the Laws of the Land – 
The Laws of the Land, which divide Right from Wrong, 
And strengthen the Weak, by weak’ning the Strong; 
 For our Roof we will raise, and our Song still shall be – 
 Laws equal and just, for a People that’s free. 
. . . . 
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                             IX. 
Huzza! my brave Boys, our Work is complete, 
The World shall admire Columbia’s fair Seat; 
It’s Strength against Tempest and Time shall be Proof, 
And Thousands shall come to dwell under our ROOF. 
 Whilst we drain the deep Bowl, our Toast still shall be – 
 Our Government firm, and our Citizens free.1
 
During a fireside chat with the nation, a popular president declares that “the 
only sure bulwark of continuing liberty” is a strong government and an 
informed citizenry.2  In a path-breaking ruling, the Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court decry the “romantic paternalism” inherent in so much of the 
country’s history of sex discrimination, which “put women, not on a pedestal, 
but in a cage.”3
What unites these examples is a common cultural background – a political 
fellowship, if you will.  Every country has its peculiar discursive practices, part 
of the political knowledge that its citizens have inherited.  Drawing on a deep 
reservoir of constitutional thought, Americans have made their collective will 
known.  What truly makes these statements sing, however, is their prominent 
use of figurative prose.  As enduring as they are powerful, metaphor and 
metonym have served generations of lawyers and activists in the daily practice 
of democratic self-governance. 
As the ratification debate reached a crescendo in those crucial months 
between the fall of 1787 and the following spring, the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution enlisted a potent image – schema of the human body – to portray 
a new set of relationships between the people and their government.  These 
leading men warned against the “dismemberment of the Union,”4 appealed to 
the “great body of the people”5 rather than to existing institutions, and 
1 “A.B.” [Francis Hopkinson], The Raising: A New Song for Federal Mechanics, 
PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 169-70 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
2 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Apr. 14, 1938), in FDR’S FIRESIDE CHATS 
111, 118 (Russell D. Buhite & David W. Levy eds., Univ. of Okla. Press 1992) (“Therefore, 
the only sure bulwark of continuing liberty is a government strong enough to protect the 
interests of the people, and a people strong enough and well enough informed to maintain its 
sovereign control over its government.”). 
3 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).  As Sam 
Bagenstos has argued, the mobilized vernacular of second-wave feminism captured here has 
been recycled with great success by disability rights advocates.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 16 n.59 (2004) (“[T]he disability rights 
movement plainly drew on the feminist movement’s argument that paternalistic policies 
placed women on a ‘pedestal’ that was in fact a ‘cage.’” (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 
684)). 
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 7 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1937).  
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 243 (defining a republic to 
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presented the proposal as a “republican remedy for the diseases most incident 
to republican government.”6  In this way, they sought to counter Anti-federalist 
warnings that the Union would “prostrate all the state legislatures,” which the 
Anti-federalists described as the collective “soul of a confederation.”7
In our own time, competing metaphoric models of the First Amendment 
have propelled the creation of a robust free speech culture.  This has occurred 
as individual expression has been variously conceptualized as a valuable 
commodity to be traded, as a worthy analogue of legislative debate, or as an 
incendiary device to be extinguished.  Each of these embodiments of legal 
doctrine has not only remade our substantive commitments at crucial moments; 
at a basic level, each device has also helped to cement the centrality of popular 
language to democratic practice.8
Once we begin to recognize the ubiquity of common ways in democratic 
discourse, several pressing questions emerge.  First, what are we to make of 
the instinct of advocates and citizens to joust over metaphors as ardently as 
they cross swords over principles?  Second and more broadly, what role does 
metaphor play in shaping our sense of political community?  Third, can a 
robust role for judges be justified within the complicated polyphony of 
constitutional dialogue? 
The gap in the literature – as well as the tantalizing opportunity for inquiry – 
is best illuminated by toggling between the vantage point of the political 
thinker and the rhetorician.  All too often, political theory takes linguistic 
processes for granted; language theory, for its part, sees politics as simply 
another arena for ordinary expression.  Neither goes far enough in elucidating 
the significance of this basic unit of constitutional knowledge. 
To borrow from Jefferson,9 we might call metaphor democracy’s handmaid 
– for it is central to matters of democratic design and, to a remarkable extent, 
be “a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of 
the people”); accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 304 
(explaining that all forms of American governance are “dependent on the great body of the 
citizens of the United States”). 
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 62. 
7 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 525-26 
(1969). 
8 ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CULTIVATING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at x, on file with author); see also Robert L. Tsai, Fire, 
Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 235 (2004) (analyzing how 
the metaphors of fire, assembly, and marketplace collectively cultivated our free speech 
culture). 
9 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (May 4, 1801), in STEPHEN HOWARD 
BROWNE, JEFFERSON’S CALL FOR NATIONHOOD, at xvi (2003) (laying out a vision of 
governance that emphasized the “encouragement of agriculture and of commerce as its 
handmaid”).  In playing upon his usage, I intend both to highlight Jefferson’s provocative 
language and to invite consideration of democratic culture beyond merely the “essential 
principles” Jefferson and others have espoused.  Id. at xv. 
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subservient to popular will.  Metaphoric models of constitutional life signal 
what democracy means in each generation; how the promise of democracy is 
to be fulfilled; and why it is an idea worth fighting for.  While the starting 
point may be semantics, the ultimate object of concern is not simply how legal 
language is arranged, but rather how comprehension facilitates the formation 
of a democratic culture.  My conception of democracy is therefore necessarily 
a thin one – revolving, as it does, around dynamics of political self-
understanding, evaluation, and implementation.  While the account of 
governing discourse I offer is consistent with more robust conceptions of 
democracy (even ones that change over time), alone it is capable of neither 
justifying any particular substantive commitments nor ensuring just outcomes. 
My effort to sketch a theory of constitutional vernacular unfolds in four 
movements.  Part I situates metaphor at the intersection of democratic theory 
and the study of ordinary language.  It then strives to reconnect the popular and 
poetic elements of language with the political processes that generate and 
sustain a democratic ethos. 
If law is treated as a cultural product rather than as a set of rules,10 then 
metaphor cannot simply be seen merely as a problem-solving technique in an 
isolated dispute.  Rather, we should treat it as a vehicle whose primary 
importance is to reinforce democratic values.  Part II examines metaphor’s 
core functions in a modern republic.  Metaphor not only confronts the 
problems of time and the forces of disunion, it also increases popular control of 
law and repairs disjunctions in political community.  In order to illustrate these 
points, I shall evaluate the mobilized rhetoric of the founding era, the civil 
rights movement, and the religious revival of the last quarter century.  I also 
consider the centrality of metaphor to the juridic segregation and reintegration 
of sexual minorities. 
Once we grasp the state-building function of democracy’s metaphors, it may 
be wise to rethink the process of legal change.  Part III explores the 
significance of a discursive theory of constitutional law by juxtaposing it with 
leading accounts of constitutional change.  I find that a decentralized rhetorical 
model offers a superior account of the relationships among the actors who 
claim to act on the people’s behalf.  Within this model, judges act principally 
as language builders.  In this capacity, judges shape and test the tools by which 
our foundational commitments are contested. 
Finally, Part IV anticipates objections to an account of democratic 
governance that elevates the role of constitutional vernacular.  I scrutinize and 
ultimately reject two criticisms: first, that judges are not authorized to speak in 
figurative terms and second, that rhetorical creativity should be reserved for 
political actors alone. A vision of decentralized dialogue, I conclude, is neither 
frightening nor utopian but one that fits comfortably within our political 
10 See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77 (2003) (arguing that “law is both a cultural product and a 
vehicle for the regulation and discipline of culture”). 




I. FROM DISCURSIVE PRACTICE TO CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
A. Interdisciplinarity as Opportunity 
The democracy-enhancing qualities of figurative language have been 
neglected for too long.  This inattention is somewhat surprising because 
political theorists certainly have a fondness for dialogic models of governance.  
Bruce Ackerman’s provocative theory of dualism splits the atom of self-rule 
into ordinary and higher lawmaking in an effort to derive authentic 
“conversation between generations.”11  Barry Friedman believes that he has 
solved the countermajoritarian difficulty by relaxing Alexander Bickel’s major 
premises so as to envision that “the Constitution is interpreted on a daily basis 
through an elaborate dialogue.”12  Everywhere one turns, speech-modeled 
theories of law and politics abound.13
Yet the interactive process envisioned by constitutional theorists – if it is 
articulated at all – nearly always assumes the grandest of scales.  Dialogue is 
less explicated than it is employed as a heuristic device to portray the political 
system as generative of public reason in a more or less orderly fashion.14  For 
the democrat, principles for governance ultimately sustain and legitimate the 
legal order.  Turning from ideal theory to the actual governance of large scale 
democracies, Robert Dahl elaborates his five basic precepts of democracy15 
11 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 23 (1991); see also LOUIS 
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 3-6 (1988).  
But see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 47-49 (2001) (criticizing speech-based models 
of democracy as “presentist”). 
12 Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580-81 (1993).  
Friedman rejects Alexander Bickel’s major assumptions that (1) the Constitution was 
designed to facilitate rule by present political majorities and (2) judicial pronouncements 
are, for all practical purposes, the final word on a subject.  Id. at 582-83. 
13 Democracy as dialogue is by now an ingrained model of constitutional thought, even 
as it has inspired many departures from its agreed-upon starting point.  See, e.g., FISHER, 
supra note 11, at 3 (contending that constitutional law “is a process in which all three 
branches converge and interact with their separate interpretations”); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 
DUKE L.J. 223, 241 (2001) (claiming that federalism cases “reveal both striking continuities 
and marked new notes in the ongoing constitutional dialogue about federalism”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 86-87 (1985) 
(exploring the various models of constitutional lawmaking). 
14 See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 10-11 (1982).  
Habermas has advanced the idea of “communicative rationality,” by which subjects 
pragmatically relate to one another, reach collective agreement as to claims of validity, and 
thereby transform their society. 
15 Dahl identifies five elements of any true democracy, regardless of size: (1) effective 
participation; (2) equal suffrage; (3) enlightened understanding; (4) control of the agenda; 
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into six conditions that must be met before any modern country can justifiably 
call itself democratic: (1) elected officials; (2) free, fair, and frequent elections; 
(3) freedom of expression; (4) access to alternative sources of information; (5) 
associational autonomy; and (6) inclusive citizenship.16  Of these six 
principles, two are concerned with the mechanisms of popular control of 
government through suffrage (1, 2); two are concerned with ensuring the 
overall availability of information (3, 4); and the remaining deal with two 
institutional preconditions for self-rule: autonomy and equality (5, 6). 
Under the liberal tradition exemplified by the Dahlian approach, democracy 
is both defined (in that it may be said to exist) and sustained (in that it may be 
said to survive beyond its birth-moment) according to formal criteria.  The 
necessity of “enlightened understanding” of democracy is, to be sure, 
acknowledged.17  But it is largely taken for granted, hopefully (and at best, 
indirectly) prodded by rules that protect spheres of individualism. 
John Hart Ely’s magisterial work, Democracy and Distrust,18 echoes this 
preference for organization.  Ely’s starting point is that the Constitution is 
“overwhelmingly concerned with . . . process writ large.”19  His representation-
reinforcing model encourages courts to parse governing texts so as to facilitate 
popular government; where persistent majorities have perverted the political 
system, it is the judge’s obligation to restore fairness.20  Although Ely goes 
wrong in suggesting that such a role can be considered in any way value-
neutral, he properly sees the Constitution as a roadmap for governance.  
Nevertheless, Ely – like Dahl before him – never ventures beyond a structural 
(and mostly majoritarian) account of democracy.21
This is a shame.  For democracy is more than the mechanics of 
policymaking; it is greater than the sum of its precepts.  Democracy is an entire 
way of life: distinctive manners of speaking, recurring modalities for relating 
and (5) inclusion of adults.  ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 37-38 (1998). 
16 Id. at 85-86.  Dahl calls a modern democracy that adheres to these precepts a 
polyarchy.  Id. at 90. 
17 Id. at 37 (describing the requirement for “enlightened understanding” to be that 
“[w]ithin reasonable limits as to time, each member must have equal and effective 
opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely 
consequences”). 
18 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
19 Id. at 87.  Ely does acknowledge that a number of the provisions in the document deal 
with individualistic concerns, which he characterizes as “process writ small.”  Id. 
20 Id. at 86.  Ely is no proponent of untrammeled majoritarianism.  He believes that 
courts are justified when they intervene on behalf of discrete and insular minorities because 
doing so enhances self-rule.  As always, the devil remains in the details as to when a 
political measure has unfairly skewed the political process. 
21 Ely nowhere admits that the conception of democracy he favors – rather than, say, 
strict majoritarianism or a more robust role for judicial intervention – is itself a substantive 
value choice.  Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 754 
(2004). 
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to others, and penetrating frameworks through which to perceive the social 
world.22  A culture of self-empowerment is not merely a byproduct of politics; 
rather, the cultivation of a democratic disposition lies at the very heart of 
constitutionalism.  Linguistic infrastructure and political architecture go hand 
in hand.  To the extent that theory misses these features of democratic 
existence, it fails to account for the rich, everyday vehicles by which promises 
are kept over time. 
If the democrat’s vantage point can be unhelpfully panoramic, the 
rhetorician’s perspective is all too often oddly telescopic.  Attention is trained 
upon grammatical structure in splendid isolation, with only the emotive 
features of language on display.23  Northrop Frye, for example, has called “the 
starting point of metaphor” its ecstatic quality, “the sense of identity of an 
individual’s consciousness with something in the natural world.”24  Others 
share this primal sense that ordinary language lays bare the hidden depths of 
the soul and the simpler, unadulterated social order that lies beneath the grime 
and clutter of modern existence. 
In this humanistic glow, law looks, sounds, and behaves like everyday 
speech.  Legal reasoning is understood as imaginative rather than linear, and is 
itself built upon metaphoric models that flourish in ordinary discourse.  
Behold: as the human face of law ascends, the institutional dynamic of law 
recedes.  The judge is thereby stripped of his ceremonial garb, revealing him to 
be no different from the man on the street.25
But this demystification comes at a high price.  For law then becomes as 
expansive as the human mind, which is to say that it extends everywhere and 
nowhere in particular.  The jarring result is to replace a disfavored form of 
textualism with another, less familiar, semantic game. 
The greatest casualty of too hard a turn toward the philosophy of the mind 
may be our conception of the relationship between politics and language.  
Consider James Boyd White, who rightly views law as a creative medium 
through which we organize ourselves in communal arrangements.26  
22 CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 10 (John Ferejohn, Jack N. 
Rakove & Jonathan Riley eds., 2001) (“A constitutional culture is a web of interpretative 
norms, canons, and practices which most members of a particular community accept and 
employ.”). 
23 See, e.g., Diana Williams-Whitney et al., Metaphor Production in Creative Writing, 21 
J. OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH 497-509 (1992) (summarizing a research study in which 
writers produced metaphors related to intensely emotional experiences). 
24 NORTHROP FRYE, MYTH AND METAPHOR: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1974-1988, at 111-112 
(Robert D. Denham ed., 1990). 
25 Cf. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of 
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004) (describing a judge as 
a “[s]ituational magician” adept at “[s]chematic sleight-of-hand”). 
26 JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND 
POLITICS, at xi (1994). 
 2006] DEMOCRACY’S HANDMAID 9 
 
 
“[A]uthority is a subject of art” because “authority is created by an act of 
art.”27  Yet a closer look reveals that White undertakes an ambitious 
reconceptualization of law itself: he urges us to see law “not as a bureaucratic 
but as a rhetorical process.”28
One danger with the pure law-as-rhetoric model, however, is that even as it 
purports to ground law as a creature of culture, the account threatens to 
decouple the constitutional actor from the very processes that generate public 
culture.  Society cannot do without institutions.  In the story of Genesis, God 
exists before the Israelites demand a king.29  Similarly, in ideal theory we are 
asked to imagine a pre-law environment too brutish to abide;30 everyone else is 
born into a world ruled by organizations and nation-states.  A people cannot 
speak or act except through or in opposition to existing forms of political 
authority. 
While there can never be total escape from the bureaucratic forces that seek 
to mold our lives, one can never be fully content with the state of affairs.  This 
gives rise to the civic dilemma facing the citizen of every constitutional 
democracy.31  She is always negotiating obligations, pulled between her desire 
to be free from existing manifestations of authority and her duty to obey.  
Constitutional discourse, in turn, is always about perfecting, subverting, or 
transcending political institutions. 
Another difficulty with the unadulterated rhetoric model is that 
bureaucracies generate their own modalities, each with their own priorities and 
pathologies.  Institutions are as much the masters of language as they are 
subject to linguistic dynamics. 
For the most part, accounts of the deep structures shared by constitutional 
language and democratic politics remain incomplete.  Steve Winter, who has 
done much to renew scholarly interest in the internal structure of legal 
27 Id. at 276. 
28 James Boyd White describes rhetoric as “the central art by which community and 
culture are established, maintained, and transformed . . . [with] justice as its ultimate 
subject.”  Id. at 684; see also James Boyd White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways 
of Reading, Ways of Life, in LAW AND LITERATURE: TEXT AND THEORY 5, 17 (Lenora 
Ledwon ed., 1995).  White describes his own reading of legal language as “profoundly 
antibureaucratic.”  Id. at 17.  
29 1 Samuel 8:6 (New Jerusalem) (“So give us a king to judge us, like the other 
nations.”). 
30 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIII (J.M. Dent & Sons 1947) (1651).  Hobbes’ pre-
law world was the fearful state of nature occurring at the beginning of time in which no 
moral constraints prevented man from using force to secure creature comforts, material gain, 
and personal glory.  Id. 
31 The Israelites’ demand for a king is, in fact, their second important act of self-
liberation from their God-creator (the first being the willful disregard of a direct order not to 
eat of the forbidden fruit).  Cf. 1 Genesis 2:17 (New Jerusalem).  In order to live in the 
world and among other nations, they wished to organize themselves in familiar political 
forms.  In their eyes, this would engender internal identity and external respect. 
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language, treats metaphor as central to law because it orders the imagination.32  
He rejects a vision of law that rests on raw politics and leads to radical 
indeterminacy,33 but at the cost of making political processes seem strangely 
irrelevant.  In his account, where law is in all critical respects like ordinary 
language, the habits of mind take center stage.  Winter aptly realizes that 
cognitive theory leads to the “democratization of the imagination,” but this 
tantalizing insight remains mostly undeveloped.34
B. Recovering the Political 
Reorienting metaphor within constitutional politics captures its myriad 
functions in higher lawmaking.  When I say that I intend to reclaim the 
political dimensions of metaphor, I do not mean that metaphor contains a 
naked partisan core, but rather that it aids institution-building and is subject to 
changes in political ethos.  Where White hopes that institutional and policy 
studies can be subsumed within the study of rhetoric,35 I urge the inversion of 
this relationship: legal rhetoric is best understood as a species of foundational 
politics. 
Anchoring constitutional language in democratic theory serves two ends.  
First, it shifts our study of legal language away from individual comprehension 
and toward issues of institutional design.  Doing so adds complexity to our 
understanding of constitutional change.  What seems possible rather than 
fanciful to ordinary Americans and their leaders is not merely a matter of 
lexical arrangements, but a function of the political and social conditions of the 
day. 
Second, anchoring constitutional language in democratic theory also places 
metaphor and other language devices on sounder theoretical footing.  The 
primary defense of poetry in law is that it is simply unavoidable – a tactic that 
Kenji Yoshino has called the “ineradicability” defense.36  This recalls Winter’s 
primary strategy: with George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,37 he insists that 
because “metaphor is an essential aspect of human rationality, there can be no 
difference in kind between the ‘rigors’ of reason and the demands of poetry.”38  
But if, as I argue, not all metaphors are alike in function, then the power of the 
ineradicability defense wanes.  Moreover, as Yoshino rightly argues, even if 
32 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 12-16 (2001). 
33 See id. at 309-313. 
34 See id. at 21. 
35 James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and 
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985). 
36 Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 (2005).  Expositing 
what he calls the “Platonic paradigm,” Yoshino argues that law justifiably excludes poetics 
that promote falsity, irrationality, and are themselves too seductive to be countenanced.  Id. 
at 1860-68. 
37 See infra note 53. 
38 WINTER, supra note 32, at 68. 
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poetry cannot be totally banished from law, this provides at best a thin 
justification for art’s role in statecraft.39  The challenge taken up by the rest of 
this article is to provide a virtuous and energetic defense of popular 
constitutional language.40
As Marbury v. Madison teaches, law is not law unless it sets itself in 
opposition to politics.41  For law to exist, the language of principle must 
continually be carved out of the realm of expediency.42  Law also could not 
exist, however, if its symbiotic connection with politics were entirely severed.  
After all, it is the political sphere that grounds the interpretive enterprise, sets 
the outer boundaries of legal possibility, and gives judicial utterances texture 
and bite.  This, too, is a lesson of Marbury, but only to the careful reader.43  
Ultimately, once judges read law, political processes validate, erode, or 
supplant juridic conceptions of law.44  It is this twilight between law and 
politics that popular constitutional language inhabits. 
Ordinary language complements doctrinal architecture in the formation and 
maintenance of political community.  Every constitutional metaphor constructs 
a portable vision of democracy and signals what the people’s place within the 
political order is to be.  The metaphor shows us why a particular conception of 
self-determination is worth our allegiance; it demands eternal vigilance on its 
39 See Yoshino, supra note 36, at 1859 (“[P]oetry will only be permitted if it can 
affirmatively show that it can fulfill state functions.”). 
40 With Yoshino, I contend that metaphor “should not be banished because it has the 
capacity to serve, rather than merely to subvert, the proper ends of the state.”  Id. at 1839.  I 
need not accept Plato’s original notion of an objective transcendental truth; nor do I accept 
that rationality and irrationality are diametrically opposed categories. 
 41 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
42 Id. at 173-78 (1803); see generally PAUL KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. 
MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997) (teasing apart the structure of the 
judicial imagination); Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095 (2005) 
(examining legal catechisms that have descended from Marbury). 
43 Who else would appreciate the delicious irony of the Court thumping its chest about 
the importance of legally vested rights even as it afforded William Marbury no remedy, or 
of John Marshall’s interest in vindicating his personal failure to deliver the commission 
while not appearing cowed by a new administration bent on reversing the gains of the last 
Federalist administration?  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 8 (2005) 
(arguing that Marbury was a “large strategic retreat” rather than a vindication of judicial 
power). 
44 This has been true with every major constitutional event, from the recalibration of 
legal commitments in the 1930s to facilitate the New Deal agenda, to the revival of rights-
based jurisprudence during America’s post-war transformation into an exemplar of 
democratic constitutionalism.  For a thoughtful take on the rise of democratic 
constitutionalism, see Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 28-30 (2003) (proclaiming an “Age of 
Democracy,” in which the constitutionalism of democratic politics features prominently). 




Take Justice Scalia’s kulturkampf metaphor, which is today etched in the 
minds of lawyer and layman alike.  In Romer v. Evans,45 he argued in dissent: 
I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) 
to take sides in this culture war. . . .  
. . . .  
 When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the 
knights rather than the villeins – and more specifically with the Templars, 
reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court’s 
Members are drawn.46
Those who have taken Justice Scalia to task for the bitterness of his prose 
usually miss the more significant point.47  His terminology is effective and 
eminently quotable precisely because it cuts to the quick.  As a dialogic tool, it 
accomplishes things that mere denotative speech or doctrinal argumentation 
cannot.  According to the vision of self-governance encapsulated in his martial 
imagery, the people are better off (or at least have no cause to complain) when 
left to their own devices.  In such situations, courts are more likely to supplant 
collective moral preferences with poor shadows of their own.  This, Scalia 
suggests, is not only improper, but also deeply undemocratic. 
Now, it is one thing to say that courts should stay out of cultural conflicts; it 
is quite another to be able to distinguish such phenomena from other highly 
fraught matters.  The binary image of social strife between two armies 
reinforces the impression that any involvement by the courts inevitably and 
unfairly sways the outcome.  This image not only (over)simplifies the complex 
political dynamics in play by suggesting that such battles are fair fights,48 it 
45 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
46 Id. at 652.  Justice Scalia recycles this metaphor in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the 
culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules 
of engagement are observed.”).  Scalia’s reference to “Templars” refers to the Knight 
Templars, a monastic order formed at the end of the Crusades to assist pilgrims to the Holy 
Lands.  ANDRÉ MAUROIS, A HISTORY OF FRANCE 60-61 (Henry L. Binsse & Gerard Hopkins 
trans., First Evergreen ed., Grove Press Inc. 1960).  Within two centuries, the Knight 
Templars had grown powerful and rich, answering only to the Papal Throne.  Id.  In 1307, 
King Phillip crushed the order brutally through a series of arrests, rounds of torture, public 
trials, and executions.  Id. 
47 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 203, 228 (1996) (characterizing Scalia’s Romer dissent as “derisive”); Taking 
the Initiative, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10, 1996, at 8 (describing Scalia’s dissent as 
“indulg[ing] in his own fit of spite”). 
48 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free 
Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers. [Raising 
Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
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also denies that democratic values might call for the taking of sides.49
Nevertheless, as a “messenger of meaning,”50 a tidy metaphor such as this 
one moves briskly between social domains, carrying democratic bricolage back 
and forth to different constitutional actors.  Justice Scalia’s militaristic 
rendering of a doctrine of non-interventionism has become a rallying cry for 
process conservatives and social conservatives alike;51 it has even left a lasting 
mark on fellow jurists.52
To be sure, the statements of jurists and officials are presumptively 
authoritative in ways that everyday speech is not.  Bureaucratic forces are 
different in each arena of linguistic development.  Yet it is no less political in 
the institution-fortifying sense I have described when a judge employs 
metaphor than when a spokesperson for an interest group does.  Aristotle 
called man a natural “political animal.”53  Metaphor is a natural way of 
inscribing and publicizing humankind’s commitments. 
II. DEMOCRACY’S METAPHORS 
Because democrats and rhetoricians so often talk past one another, they 
routinely fail to notice metaphor’s salient qualities in the production of 
constitutional norms.  I will now strive to tease them out. 
As a preliminary matter, let us distinguish between basic-level metaphor and 
CRIMINOLOGY 503, 507-08 (2004) (arguing that Scalia incorrectly characterizes the culture 
wars as a “two-sided military conflict”).  The metaphor also occludes the fact that the social 
contest over the citizenship rights of sexual minorities involves many different coalitions 
and agendas.  Id. at 516-24. 
49 Jack Balkin has provided an excellent discussion of the flaws in Scalia’s perspective, 
namely that every fight over social status is a cultural conflict, and that the principle of 
equality requires courts to take sides in such contests.  See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of 
Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2317-20 (1997); cf. Post, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that 
“[u]nless the Court were to cease protecting constitutional values altogether, it cannot avoid 
entanglement in the ‘culture wars’ that sometimes sweep the country”). 
50 SABINE MAASEN & PETER WEINGART, METAPHORS AND THE DYNAMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 
20 (2000). 
51 No media account of the ruling could bypass the phrase “culture war.”  See, e.g., Linda 
Greenhouse, Gay Rights Laws Can’t Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 
1996, at 1 (highlighting Scalia’s use of the phrase “culture war”).  
52 Neither “culture war” nor “kulturkampf” appears in the writings of federal judges 
before Justice Scalia’s vivid exposition.  Afterward, the image experienced a sudden surge 
in popularity.  See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 614 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (insisting that government usage of 
the phrase “In God We Trust” or “under God” “have not led us down the long path to 
kulturkampf or worse.”); Am. Family Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 
1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (“This case is a skirmish in the culture 
wars of the last century.”); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 
1024, 1035 (D. Neb. 2002) (“[F]ederal courts are a poor place to fight the culture wars.”). 
53 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS Book I ii, 1253a1, at 59 (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1992).   
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its specialized variety.  Basic or first-order metaphors are fundamental to 
language itself.  When George Lakoff and Mark Johnson explicate the 
container metaphor and the travel metaphor in everyday discourse,54 they 
describe two linguistic structures that are to the formation of ideas what air and 
water are to basic survival.  Consider these statements: • John’s argument contains flaws. • Jane’s speech proceeded logically from point A to point B; her 
words moved the audience. 
Every metaphor combines information from two conceptual domains.  
Meaning is generated through the mapping of entailments from the source 
domain (made up of experiential data about an idea or an event) upon the 
target domain (a second and often more abstract idea).55  As the above 
statements reveal, certain metaphors are imbedded in our very system of 
communication.  We organize ideas “in” mental containers of all shapes and 
sizes – indeed, we tend to speak as if meaning is inherent in the words 
themselves rather than dependent upon context.  We then send ideas “in 
motion” to persuade others, employing the argument-as-travel metaphor.56  We 
cannot do without these basic-level metaphors in our daily affairs, just as we 
cannot do without them in the law. 
The same cannot be said of specialized metaphors, though this difference 
does not diminish their importance to the political order.  Metaphors contained 
in such famous sayings as the “bulwark of liberty”57 or the “revolutionary 
spark”58 are not indispensable in the sense that legal utterances would be 
54 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 115-19 (2003); 
GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL 
ABOUT THE MIND 284-85 (1987); see also Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor: A 
Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language About Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 
286-292 (Andrew Ortony ed., 1979) (discussing the centrality of the “conduit metaphor” in 
the transference of thoughts through language). 
55 LAKOFF, supra note 54, at 276-78. 
56 See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 115-119. 
57 Many things have been characterized as “grand bulwarks of liberty,” from the right to 
trial by jury, Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *349); to the notion of 
the free press, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 286 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (quoting 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 335 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1859)) [hereinafter 
“DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES”]; to the Great Writ, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Even the whole of the Bill of Rights has been 
described in this way.  United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Yet the efficacy of the Bill of Rights as the bulwark of our national liberty 
depends precisely upon public appreciation of the special character of constitutional 
prescriptions.”). 
58 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) (“A single revolutionary spark may 
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive 
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incomprehensible without them.  Rather, they are valuable in that they 
elucidate and dramatize a set of foundational commitments and political 
relationships.  In so doing, they assist in the construction of democracy as a 
social practice that is lived, valued, and contested. 
Call these second-order metaphors.  In employing this term, I intend to 
signify qualitative differences in category and function, as well as in priority of 
importance to the dynamics of political self-understanding.  These 
compositions are at once more focused and more performative than their first-
order brethren.  Second-order metaphors gain prominence where the bulk of 
first-order metaphors remain imbedded and unnoticed.  Many arise in one 
doctrinal setting and become closely associated with a particular area of law; a 
few are later borrowed for other contexts because of their allure.  They engage 
the intellect in a more extended fashion than first-order metaphors – they are 
particularly tacky in our political imagination – and therefore legitimate 
constitutional regimes precisely because of their gestalt properties. 
Constitutional metaphor, a species of second-order metaphor, is a 
multifunctional composition in a democratic society.59  The very ideal of 
democracy – demos (“by the people”) and kratia (“rule”) – presupposes 
understanding of the basic rules of participatory government and, more 
precisely, proficiency with the patois of self-rule. 
In this light, we can say that metaphor serves four principal functions in the 
ongoing project of democracy.  Metaphor: • conquers time by building interpretive fellowship and legitimating 
political arrangements; • levels the law by making commitments accessible to the average 
member of the republic; • enhances democratic accountability through popular mobilization 
and litigation; and  • repairs rifts in the fabric of legal community posed by changed 
social norms and political realignments. 
Each characteristic addresses a particular core facet of democratic myth-
making.  I employ the term “myth” in a non-pejorative sense to describe the 
patchwork of beliefs, outlooks, terminology, and discursive tactics that 
together characterize a political community’s raison d’être and its members’ 
relationships with one another. 
I take each function of metaphor in turn, drawing on examples from actual 
constitutional practice. 
conflagration.”); see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (“[T]he 
circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a 
flame”). 
59 It is certainly true that non-foundational metaphors exhibit some of these traits.  I 
confine my analysis to constitutional metaphors, which arguably face a different set of 
institutional and cultural forces both within and without the Judiciary. 
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A. Conquering Time 
The challenge for statesmen of every age has always been this: how to build 
a lasting and more just society.  Time is their principal enemy.  The threats of 
time are manifold.  A founding generation ages, and its members will one day 
die out.  Before they do, they might pursue policies that devastate the youth 
(say, an aggressive war agenda) or the conditions for governance (say, a risky 
economic policy).  Even when the rates of birth and immigration outpace death 
and exit, there is always the danger that the next generation neglects the 
commitments made by elders.  How, then, can a people cheat death and 
forgetfulness? 
1. Participation and Memory 
Since the days of the ancient Greeks, plans for stability over time were 
rooted in organizational structures that maximized mankind’s virtues.  In The 
Politics, Aristotle observed: 
It is useless to have the most beneficial laws, fully agreed upon by all 
who are members of the constitution, if they are not going to be trained 
and have their habits formed in the spirit of that constitution – in a 
democratic spirit, that is, if the laws are democratic.60
Aristotle’s solution was the “middle” constitution, which he believed 
represented a “well-made combination of oligarchy and democracy.”61  An 
educational system worthy of a wise ruling class would serve as a crucial 
backstop against internal decay.62
On occasion, one caught glimpses of a deeper truth: something beyond well-
formulated policies might be required to cultivate a truly rich democratic way 
of life.  Plato foresaw the need to engage in political story-telling in order to 
forge the “courage of a citizen”63 within a well-ordered society.  Consider this 
exchange between the figure of Socrates and his companions in The Republic: 
“[H]ear the rest of the myth: ‘All of you in the city are brothers,’ we’ll tell 
them, ‘but the most precious are the ones fit to rule, because when the god 
formed you at birth he mixed gold into them, silver into the auxiliaries, 
and iron and bronze into the farmers and craftsmen. . . . And we’ll pretend 
there’s an oracle that predicts the downfall of the city when she’s guarded 
by the guardian of iron or bronze.  Can you think of a scheme to make 
them believe this tale, Glaucon?” 
 “Not them,” he replied, “but their sons and descendents and all later 
60 ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V ix, 1310a12, at 331. 
61 Id. Book IV ix, 1294b14, at 262-63. 
62 Id. Book VIII I, 1337a11, at 452 (concluding that where the youth receive inadequate 
education, “the quality of the constitution suffers”); see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 2, 
376c-d, at 48 (Raymond Larson ed. & trans., AHM Publ’g Corp. 1979). 
63 See PLATO, supra note 62, Book 4, 430b-d, at 97. 




 For Plato, the myth of the ideal city’s origins maintains intergenerational 
community and mediates the tension between two foundational principles: 
civic equality and temperate governance.65  The myth itself is enabled by an 
extended metaphor of a society populated by persons born of different metals, 
as well as the metonymic identification of each citizen-type with a particular 
social function.  Elsewhere, Plato selects a new metaphor to describe the 
process of political acculturation as “a scheme to persuade [the guardians-to-
be] to take our laws like a beautiful dye.”66  If one can put aside the 
hierarchical and insular tendencies of classical republican thought, this insight 
is well worth recovering: symbolic formulations of the citizenry and ruling 
institutions have, since the very beginning, advanced the loftiest goals of self-
rule. 
The importance of a political mythology has never been more important.  
Everywhere the prospects for self-governance in the United States seem 
cloudy: the country is too large, its demographics ever-changing; the people 
are too divided by regional priorities and idiosyncratic tastes.  Our daily lives 
are propelled by personal concerns rather than collective aspirations.  Against 
this backdrop, the formation of political community requires a suspension of 
disbelief in one form of reality, and the adoption – on blind faith – of another. 
It turns out that metaphor is not the repository of a “faded mythology,”67 but 
a utensil for the care and feeding of the political imagination in the here and 
now.  Taken literally, a metaphor is an untrue statement: people are not, in fact, 
born color-coded; one searches in vain for a physical barrier between the 
people whose liberties are at stake and those who might trample them.  But 
notice how metaphor’s jarring, even confounding, quality reproduces 
democracy’s baseline values of engagement, skepticism, and critique. 
A second-order metaphor stages a clash of meanings that invites a listener to 
participate in political fellowship.  The act of affiliation calls upon the citizen 
first to reconcile the incongruities inherent in each distinctive metaphor; then, 
having resolved the incompatibility (or at least made peace with it), to 
internalize and repeat it.  Here I elaborate upon Ted Cohen’s insight that 
metaphor has the power to “cultivate intimacy.”68  By reworking such 
64 PLATO, supra note 62, Book 3, 415-d, at 84-85. 
65 Id. Book 4, 423, at 90.  For an extended discussion of Plato’s understanding of social 
roles and specialization in the ideal state, see id. Book 2, 370-c, at 41-42. 
66 Id. Book 4, 430, at 97.  Speaking non-literally about political myth-making, Socrates 
says, “[Y]ou know that when dyers want to dye wool purple they select from all the possible 
colors wool that is naturally white, give it a long preliminary treatment to make the color 
take, and only then dye it.  Things dyed like that are permanent, and even detergent won’t 
wash out the dye.”  Id. Book 4, 429d-e, at 96-97. 
67 ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH 85 (Susanne K. Langer trans., 1953) (quoting 
German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling).   
68 Ted Cohen, Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy, in ON METAPHOR 1, 6 (Sheldon 
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bricolage, members of the polity establish, maintain, and transform themselves 
and their democratic society.  In the process, individuals sharpen the very skills 
necessary to keep the project going. 
Metaphor’s inherent plasticity, derided by those who would demand an 
impossible clarity of word and deed, actually serves the goals of political 
fellowship.  No community can exist by requiring perfect agreement of aims 
and means.  A certain degree of ambiguity in meaning allows different 
constitutional actors to accept the validity of an idea or general framework and 
defer further conflicts over meaning.  As Louis Seidman has ingeniously 
argued, the Constitution prevents the crystallization of law, which would 
ensure perpetual political losers.69  My approach aligns with Seidman’s but 
makes a cross-cutting claim: the very structure of our constitutional language 
promotes the unsettled nature of the law. 
A popular construction of law not only possesses the capacity to draw a 
democratic audience within its mystery and hold its attention, but also acts 
upon adversaries locked in debate by incentivizing the development and 
refinement of accessible terms.  A detractor is always free to try an alternative 
language tactic, but one’s first instinct is always to co-opt a metaphor in play, 
and to take advantage of the material used by a political opponent.  Whereas 
resort to specialized terms breeds disengagement and distrust, innovative usage 
of everyday terms fosters civic engagement and faith in deliberative processes. 
2. “The Body of the People in Every State” 
For Plato, a sudden shift to figurative language drew the story’s participants 
(as well as the reader) into the very ideal state he was in the process of 
sketching.  In this way, Plato himself modeled what every democratic citizen is 
expected to do: envision political fellowship, experiment with existing models, 
and invite critique. 
For modern democrats, too, metaphorical discourse involves a constitutive 
act.  When the revolutionary generation claimed the sacred prerogative of the 
people to break loose from the suffocating confines of the Articles of 
Confederation, they undertook a project of epic proportions.  Playing to 
widespread discontent with the government was easy enough, but harnessing 
political energy for the centralization of real-time authority was a far more 
Sacks ed., 1978).  As Cohen puts it: 
There is a unique way in which the maker and the appreciator of a metaphor are drawn 
closer to one another.  Three aspects are involved: (1) the speaker issues a kind of 
concealed invitation; (2) the hearer expends a special effort to accept the invitation; and 
(3) this transaction constitutes the acknowledgment of a community.   
Id. at 6. 
69 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 86 (2001) (arguing that “the primary virtue of 
liberal constitutionalism is its incoherence, which can be put to good use if our aim is to 
build an unsettled constitution”). 
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challenging task.  Let us not forget that the Framers were not only battling the 
forces of the status quo, they were also parrying the arguments of those who 
favored outright dissolution of political community.  Excessive localism and 
anarchy had to be avoided at all costs.  Having shouldered such a daunting 
agenda, they made inventive usage of familiar cultural forms. 
From the start, metaphor played an important role in this high-stakes affair.  
Those who sought to undermine the legitimacy of the enterprise accused the 
drafters of offering nothing but “gilded chains . . . forg[ed] in the secret 
conclave.”70  Secrecy, these critics suggested, was the antithesis of political 
equality; the “rivet[ing] [of] the shackles of slavery on you and your unborn 
posterity” would surely follow.71  To this, proponents of the new order pointed 
to transparency in the ratification process and claimed the momentum; it was 
the other side, the opponents of self-rule, who “whispered in . . . private 
circles.”72
One of the most prominent and active elements of the eighteenth century 
lexicon was the body politic.73  In the Framers’ hands, the metaphor of the 
body was molded to keep citizens engaged in the ongoing project of 
constitutionalism while persuading them to consider alternative political 
configurations.  In a chorus, reformers declaimed against the “extent and 
malignity of the disease” now afflicting the political order.74
70 Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET 
(Phila.), Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 
526, 528. 
71 Id. at 535. 
72 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 7. 
73 This usage of the term “body” is not only figurative, but also organic and specialized, 
and should therefore be distinguished from use of the word “body” merely to refer to a 
particular institution (e.g., “this august body”).  Its longevity is due, in no small part, to the 
influence of classical political thinkers.  Plato writes: “When one of us smashes his thumb, 
for instance, the entire partnership of body to soul, organized into a single community under 
its ruler, instantly feels it and suffers together as one with the hurt part, and we say ‘the man 
feels pain in his thumb’” and that “the best-governed city is arranged most like such an 
organism.”  PLATO, supra note 62, Book 5, 462d, at 127.  Plato also compared the “true and 
healthy” city-state to one with “indigestion.”  Id. Book 2, 372e, at 44.  And in a move from 
the metaphorical to the literal and back again, he further ventured: “When a city gets bloated 
with self-indulgence and disease, courtrooms and doctor’s offices burst open; and litigation 
and medicine take on airs when free men take them seriously.”  Id. Book 3, 405, at 74.  See 
generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957) (analyzing the union and separation of the king’s physical and 
figurative bodies). 
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 125.  The Constitution 
was presented as a “cure” and “remedy” for the “malady” and “diseases” of faction.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 53, 62; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 
28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 170 (describing the need for an army to deal with 
“seditions and insurrections, [which] are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body 
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So compelling was this line of argument, so ingrained was the network of 
related concepts in American thought, that Anti-federalists were moved to 
confront it directly through open mockery: 
Whereas it hath been represented unto us that a most dreadful disease 
hath for these five years last past infected, preyed upon, and almost ruined 
the government and people of this our country; and of this malady we 
ourselves have had perfect demonstration, not mentally, but bodily, 
through every one of the five senses . . . .  And whereas a number of 
skilful [sic] physicians having met together at Philadelphia last summer, 
for the purpose of exploring, and if possible removing the cause of this 
direful disease, have . . . found out and discovered, that nothing but a new 
government . . . will infallibly heal every distemper in the confederation, 
and finally terminate in the salvation of America.75
Accepting this frame of understanding merely played into the Federalists’ 
hands.  Here is the lively response by Madison, who exhibited neither fear nor 
doubt about his project, but spun the metaphor still further, until its tendrils 
touched the proposal’s every surface: 
 A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an 
efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, 
after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different 
physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of 
administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians 
attend; the case of the patient is carefully examined; a consultation is 
held; they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that 
the case, with proper and timely relief, so far from being desperate, that it 
may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are 
equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect 
is to be produced. The prescription is no sooner made known, however, 
than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying the reality or 
danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be 
poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to 
make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably demand, before he 
ventured to follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree 
among themselves on some other remedy to be substituted? And if he 
found them differing as much from one another as from his first 
counsellors, would he not act prudently in trying the experiment 
unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be hearkening to 
those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree 
in proposing one? 
politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body”). 
75 John Humble, To Lick the Feet of Our Well Born Masters, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER 
(Phila.), Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 
224. 
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 Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment.76
Under this metaphorical framework, virtuous statesmen “prescribed” an 
experimental remedy, but it was a cure that only the people themselves-as-
patients could choose to ingest.  Alarmists and naysayers cried “Poison!” yet 
offered no alternative courses of treatment.  In politics, credibility is 
everything, and here the Federalists couched the body metaphor to respect the 
autonomy of the citizenry while burnishing the Federalists’ stature as well-
intentioned experts. 
At the same time that the drafters painted a word-picture of a political 
system in failing health, these leading men argued vociferously against the 
“dismemberment” of the Union.77  Alexander Hamilton, in particular, ridiculed 
those who might fail to heed the lessons of history, arguing that 
“[n]otwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, . . . there are still to 
be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox 
of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from 
each other.”78
To the Federalists and their allies, the shrillness of the opposition offered 
proof that “the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit 
of narrow and illiberal distrust.”79  In the cauldron of constitutional crisis, 
metaphor wove existing political-legal templates together with contemporary 
ethics to form a continuous whole.  The speech-tactic maintained political 
community even as it recast the most visible representations of that 
community: its language and its institutions.  It treated citizens as essential to 
the task, and encouraged them to think of democracy as an exercise in bodily 
self-preservation. 
As exquisitely as a ritual execution, the horrifying image of severed body 
parts strewn about a battlefield warned the people that preserving the status 
quo or weakening the central government would be as catastrophic as it would 
be humiliating.80  Such an act of political self-mutilation, Hamilton cautioned 
in no uncertain terms, would spell the end of the American experiment in self-
rule.  He had, of course, a wealth of concrete examples to go along with his 
vibrant image-making: dissolving the Articles without a substitute framework 
for governance would revive long-simmering territorial disputes and ultimately 
leave everyone worse off by exposing the country to intrigue and invasion by 
foreign powers.81  The primary effect of the body metaphor was to viscerally 
76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 236.   
77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 7. 
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 29 (emphasis added). 
79 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 5 (emphasis added). 
80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 29-33. 
81 “America,” Hamilton wrote,  
if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, . . . would, by the 
operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious 
labyrinths of European politics and wars . . . .  Divide et impera [divide and command] 
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reinforce the notion that there was something for which it was worth banding 
together and fighting.  Recent experiences of revolutionary sacrifice joined 
with the abstractions of democratic ideals to form a calculated message in 
favor of reform rather than a return to idyllic but disaggregated forms of self-
governance. 
Once these statesmen decoupled the notion of sovereignty from existing 
institutions, they then deftly relocated authority in “the great body of the 
people in every State,” rather than in the state itself or any other then-existing 
institution.82  “In Democracy,” they argued, “the supreme power is possessed 
by, or derived from the aggregate body of the people.”83  This technique 
decoupled the body politic from the actual institutions that give voice to the 
citizenry’s present desires.84  Several salutary effects flowed from this speech 
tactic.  First, it preserved – even sacralized – the first principle of popular 
sovereignty: the right to re-imagine political community.  The people were not 
shackled by the debate, but made free in the very act of rhetorical 
reconstitution. 
Second, the rousing notion of the body politic regained its dynamism and 
utility – a commonplace phrase became a powerful way to capture and 
promote the Federalists’ agenda.  Joyously mixing their metaphors, they 
insisted that only the “spirit of the people” themselves could “keep alive the 
sacred flame of liberty,” rather than any particular institution.85  Constitutional 
ideals being inseparable from the language used to give them life, new political 
must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 40.  There is a delicious irony 
in Hamilton’s choice of words.  “Dismemberment” of Americans’ relationships with each 
other would cause the states to become “entangled” in European wars.  See id. at 35, 40. 
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 7; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 304 (referencing “the great body of 
the citizens of the United States”).  Antifederalists attacked the Constitution for 
“consider[ing] the people of the several states as one body corporate.”  “Brutus” V, On the 
“Necessary and Proper” and the “General Welfare” Clauses, and on Congress’s Power to 
Tax: The States Will Be Destroyed, N.Y. JOURNAL, Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 499, 500.  
83 “Americanus” [John Stevens, Jr.] V, On Montesquieu, A System Monger Without 
Philosophic Precision, and More on the Errors of “Cato”, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Dec. 
12, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 487, 489. 
84 The move allowed the Framers to legitimate the use of imperfect assemblies or 
meetings out-of-doors to ratify the Constitution, for so many Americans were accustomed to 
thinking of legislatures as the entity in which “‘the members of a commonwealth are united 
and combined together into one coherent, living body.’”  WOOD, supra note 7, at 162 
(quoting PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 1779). 
85 “The Republican” to the People, “The Principal Circumstances Which Render Liberty 
Secure”, CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 710, 714.  They were quick to add, however, that “the 
constitution breathes the spirit of liberty.”  Id. at 715. 
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configurations demanded the refurbishing of older rhetorical forms. 
Third, the discursive tactic generated a set of terms to be utilized in the 
taverns, workplaces, and homes.  Separating the spirit from the word was 
critical to the rejuvenation of the political imagination.  The people could 
comfortably cast aside the Articles’ framework and overlook compliance with 
its strict terms without doing untold violence to their own interests, for the 
body politic would survive this constitutional reformation.86  Transcendence of 
the literal realm allowed the people to break the law without breaking with 
their principles.87
Although it would be folly to expect perfect congruence, the Framers’ 
constitutive metaphors maintained a high degree of consistency and coherence 
as the nation’s attention became captivated by the event.  For as Gordon Wood 
recounts, the talk of “disease” running rampant drew on the popular culture of 
the time.88  Many social commentators lamented the “Venality, Servility, and 
Prostitution [that were] eat[ing] and spread[ing] like a Cancer.”89  Other tropes 
reinforced the sacred right of the people to repair democratic deficits by 
reconstituting themselves through popular language: the people themselves 
were the “fountain of government;”90 while elected officials merely “agents”91 
and “trustees” of the law. 
This ingenious move had to invigorate even the greatest skeptic of the 
proposed Constitution.  Consider just how effectively the metaphor blunted 
critics’ strongest arguments.  Anti-federalists themselves clung to the belief 
that the states best embodied the spirit and will of the people.  Right from the 
start of the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry argued that “[s]tates are the 
characteristics and the soul of a confederation.”92  William Grayson of 
Virginia, who campaigned against ratification, accused the drafters of wishing 
“to prostrate all the state legislatures, and form a general system out of the 
86 For accounts of the Framers’ non-compliance with the terms of the Articles of 
Confederation as well as debate over its significance, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, 
Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 478-87 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 457, 464-69 (1994). 
87 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 14 (2000). 
88 WOOD, supra note 7, at 110 (“On the eve of the Revolution, America was displaying 
all the symptoms (in the lexicon of eighteenth-century political science) of a state attacked 
by disease.”). 
89 Id. (quoting Letter from John Adams to Catherine Macauley (Dec. 31, 1772), in 2 
JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 75 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961)).    
90 Id. at 530 (quoting James Wilson, Address at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention 
(Dec. 4, 1787), in JOHN BACH MCMASTER, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
1787-1788, at 316 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888)).   
91 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 305. 
92 WOOD, supra note 7, at 526 (emphasis added) (quoting Patrick Henry, Address at the 
Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES,  supra 
note 57, at 22).  
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whole.”93  Even Samuel Adams, who eventually favored ratification after the 
Bill of Rights was added, openly feared that “[t]he Body of the People tamely 
consent & submit to be . . . Slaves.”94
Matched against the Federalists’ claim of returning to first principles, these 
arguments came off as paternalistic, even obstructionist.  If the people 
themselves desired fundamental change, then formality would have to give 
way to substance; ideological purity would have to take a backseat to the 
politics of the possible.  The people’s discursive practices, in turn, would 
preserve and refract these compromises in the reformation of political 
community. 
B. Leveling the Law 
Robert Wiebe once described the pamphleteering of the founding generation 
as, at bottom, an elitist exercise: “the gentry addressed their speeches and 
pamphlets, rich with learned allusions and first principles, to one another, not 
to the people.”95  Wiebe was only half-right.  The Framers’ primary audience 
certainly consisted of the sophisticated intellectuals and opinion-makers of the 
day.  Given the subtlety and comprehensiveness of the ideas in play, however, 
it is easy for contemporary readers to overlook the accessibility and centrality 
of more basic concepts and terms.  The biblical references, images of slavery 
and liberation, and plain-talk that appeared in founding-era pamphlets were all 
aimed at bringing the public at large over to the orators’ side. 
Anyone can assemble or disassemble a metaphor – no special training is 
necessary.  In fact, a lasting insight of empiricists who study language 
acquisition is that all of these skills are second nature, part of our hard-wiring 
and cultural know-how.96  From this scientific observation one may draw a 
number of secondary inferences as to the salutary qualities of such descriptive 
grammar in American democracy.  These interlocking features can be summed 
up in three words: access, portability, and pluralism. 
1. Access 
John Locke’s expertise was not limited to political philosophy, but extended 
93 Id. at 525 (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from William Grayson to James Monroe 
(May 29, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 30 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966)).   
94 Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, The Sovereignty and Diversity of 
the States Will Be Lost (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 1, at 446, 447. 
95 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION 40 (1984). 
96 See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 115-19 (theorizing that metaphor is a 
product of people’s natural experiences); Albert N. Katz, Figurative Language and 
Thought: A Review, in FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 7-13 (Albert N. Katz et al., 
eds. 1998) (discussing the biological hard-wiring of language). 
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to language theory.  Yet he was mistaken when he claimed that “the artificial 
and figurative application of words . . . [is] for nothing else but to insinuate 
wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment.”97  Far 
from exemplifying a mistake of reason or a deliberately false statement, such 
compositions facilitate collective self-understanding. 
Metaphor’s unification of common experience and official doctrine in sing-
song renders political commitments accessible to the people.  That is to say, 
metaphor levels the law by promoting widespread understanding of 
foundational ideals among various sub-communities. 
Comprehension and habitual usage of democratic materials, in turn, breed 
fidelity.  When an individual shouts from the rooftops that freedom of 
expression is “the constitutional cornerstone of our democracy,” he is both 
claiming the birthright that citizenship affords and demonstrating obedience to 
the polity.98  On a systemic scale, even vociferous and vituperative attacks on a 
constitutional regime implicate this self-governing function of language, so 
long as they build upon accepted modalities. 
The doctrinal aspects of constitutional language are obscure and technical, 
tempting some to believe – mistakenly – that law’s legitimacy is rooted in its 
strangeness and insularity.  If we were to take this proposition seriously, 
however, we would expect the law to be more widely respected and obeyed the 
less ordinary citizens understood its basic cadence.  And we would then have 
to conclude that the law is most legitimate when there are but a handful in a 
given society who can navigate its complexities.  Or, alternatively, that 
democracy is best served when the people themselves are reduced to passive 
receptors of the law. 
But the former notion defies common sense and flirts with instability; the 
latter veers into vanguardist theories of political rule.  A free people should 
never leave the law to professionals.  More to the point, metaphor exemplifies 
the uniqueness of American constitutional discourse: it is simultaneously the 
speech of those who govern and those who are governed.  America’s rich 
history of popular rule justifies and encourages resort to figurative language: 
“the people,” James Iredell declared, “are avowedly the fountain of all 
power.”99  If law is to secure the support of not merely lawyers but the people 
97 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 146 (Alexander 
Campbell Fraser ed., 1959).  Because such figurative usages of language were “perfect 
cheats” to Locke, he insisted that “they are in all discourses that pretend to inform or 
instruct, wholly to be avoided.”  Id.  Summing up his view, Locke wrote: “language, which 
was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of society, should not be 
employed to darken truth and unsettle people’s rights.”  Id. at 131. 
98 See, e.g., Vermont House Votes Down Call for Flag-Burning Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 1995, at 11 (quoting  Jeffrey Amestoy, Vermont Attorney General, who opposed a 
resolution that urged Congress to pass a flag-burning amendment). 
99 James Iredell, Address at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 24, 1788), in 
4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES, supra note 57, at 11. 
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themselves, a theory of constitutional language must take the citizenry’s claims 
upon governing discourse seriously. 
Metaphor stimulates the political imagination.  A well-made composition 
pries open the historical memory, putting significant events, folk narratives, 
and other foundational tropes at the disposal of the virtuous citizen.  The 
mapping of abstract ideas onto everyday phenomena allows individuals to 
appreciate and internalize democratic principles. 
Although every metaphor dramatizes some features of communal life and 
occludes others, its artificiality – its constructedness – remains front and 
center.  Metaphor’s dual nature (its naturalness and artificiality) thus reminds 
citizens that all societies are socially constructed: they live, age, and pass 
away.  Even as it invites acceptance of the model of governance basking in the 
light, its existence stands as proof that there is always an alternative democratic 
formulation in the shadows, a vision of law yet to be imagined.  This has a 
reassuring effect on the people.  Far from disabling the imagination of the 
citizenry, figurative discourse instead stimulates creative reuse of political 
knowledge to build counter-metaphors and symbols.   
2. Portability 
One of metaphor’s greatest strengths (and greatest sources of concern) is its 
nomadic quality – that is, its ability to travel efficiently among social settings 
and institutions.100  Figural rhetoric facilitates participatory democracy through 
its permeability to large scale cultural shifts and its attractiveness to activists 
and lawyers.  It allows ordinary people and organizers to quickly summarize 
and publicize complicated political-legal stakes. 
Indeed, it is often a pithy metaphor that encapsulates a constitutional 
position and becomes the basis for public debate as to its merits.  School board 
members and parents, no less than trained legal advocates, can and do debate 
whether to shore up the “wall of separation between church and state.”101  A 
single encounter can ripple outward beyond county lines, from one subject 
matter to another, frequently with cumulative effects.  Once enacted, it 
becomes a legal-rhetorical strategy to be emulated or avoided, lauded or 
disparaged. 
Metaphor’s leveling functions have taken on even greater importance in the 
information age, as technology eases its diffusion.  Its vivid, compact 
amalgamations are able to rise above the din of modern life without being torn 
apart by its forces or deflected into oblivion.  Metaphor enlists popular culture 
in the service of democracy.  Beware of the skewing effect of big money on 
100 MAASEN & WEINGART, supra note 50, at 3-4 (“The single most important feature of a 
term or phrase being a metaphor is that they are [sic] ‘nomadic’, that is, taken up by and 
interacting with various discourses over time, thereby showing their malleability both 
actively and passively”).   
101 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment has erected a 
wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and impregnable.”). 
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“the marketplace of ideas” during campaign season, an activist warns (and the 
media dutifully reports it in the next news cycle).102  Congress must act to stop 
the “wildfire” of gay marriage from spreading, Senate Majority Leader Bill 
Frist declares,103 and his compatriots – local and state officials, ordinary 
Americans opposed to real or symbolic alterations to the institution of 
traditional marriage – respond to the clarion call.104  The Internet is “both a 
vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications 
and a sprawling mall offering goods and services,” the Supreme Court 
announces,105 and this rapidly enters the information stream, a digitized 
capsule of constitutional principle to be repeated in endless permutations. 
It is true, of course, that every metaphor limits the language-sphere and 
excludes information not pertinent to the conceptual network.  Great evil can 
be accomplished and the culprits’ tracks covered by beautiful language.  
Evocative language of God-given property rights masked ideologies of 
manifest destiny and policies aimed at subjugating native peoples.106  The 
fiction of separate spheres of social and political life was enlisted in 
maintenance of racial apartheid.107  A potential for abuse, however, is inherent 
in any communicative tool.  In any society that aspires to be self-governing, 
each citizen shoulders a burden to enlighten her neighbor.  If ordinary language 
is being used to perpetuate democratic injustice or to confuse or frustrate 
debate, it is incumbent upon virtuous individuals to deconstruct governing 
discourse and offer more incisive modalities of their own. 
3. Pluralism 
Finally, subpropositional devices aid the modern project of pluralism.  Due 
in part to the homogeneity of their own polity, classical theorists undervalued 
the importance of democratic patois.108  The Framers, too, made this mistake, 
believing that they would always be blessed by “a people descended from the 
102 Derek Cressman, Free Speech vs. Paid Speech, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 26, 
2004, at 9. 
103 Editorial, The Road to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, § 4, at 12. 
104 Lolita C. Baldor, Massachusetts Governor Supports Gay Unions Ban: Governor of 
State that Recognizes Gay Marriage Backs Passing Amendment Banning Same Sex 
Marriage, WIS. STATE J., June 23, 2004, at A3 (acknowledging ‘wildfire’ metaphor, and 
describing Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney’s vow to fight the recognition of gay 
marriage). 
105 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). 
106 Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian 
Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 441 (1998) (discussing the 
concept of “manifest destiny” and the appropriation of Native American lands by the U.S. 
government). 
107 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (establishing the “separate but 
equal” doctrine). 
108 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
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same ancestors, . . . [and] professing the same religion.”109  Because the world 
is so different today, democrats must re-think the nature of the ties that bind. 
The usual answer is to promote diversity of the population110 or alternative 
political arrangements.111  Amy Gutmann has argued that group identity must 
be respected in order to protect and promote the “ethical agency” of 
individuals.112  Similarly, Heather Gerken has recently discussed the 
importance of multiplying variety among institutional types as opposed to 
merely diversity of membership within them.113  As Gerken astutely 
recognizes, horizontal differentiation, no less than vertical diversity, facilitates 
pluralism, and expands opportunities for dissent.114
Yet there is a darker side to this account.  Institutional variety alone does not 
ensure that either pluralism or dissent serves the ultimate order.  In the absence 
of a common tongue and ethic, efforts to secure lasting constitutional 
achievements – even if they are borne of public spiritedness – are likely to 
prove ineffective.  Contrarian positions may be misperceived as threatening 
rather than invigorating, the ideas alien rather than indigenous.  In such an 
event, multiplying organizational or demographic diversity may well generate 
frustration and dissipate reformist energies.  This is what haunts every pluralist 
project like Banquo’s Ghost: the omnipresent threat of political atomization 
and social isolation. 
Democratic myth-making offers the missing ingredient.  In the service of 
pluralism, figurative rhetoric provides a crucial linkage between institution and 
individual, and between the bustling subcommunities that together form 
American society.  Each foundational metaphor represents an amalgamation of 
109 THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 4, at 9. 
110 See AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 26-29 (2003); WILL KYMLICKA, 
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 6, 9 (1995); 
Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 507 (2001) (advocating a model of 
cultural dissent, by which appeals to law to silence intra-group contrarians bear the burden 
of justifying claims of cultural distinctiveness and homogeneity). 
111 See David Barron, Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 487, 494-96 (1999) (offering doctrinal improvements to enhance the constitutional 
status of cities); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-
Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 150-53 (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (positing localist 
account of marriage). 
112 See GUTMANN, supra note 110, at 26-29 (explaining “ethical agency” as including  
“the capacity to live one’s own life as one sees fit consistent with respecting equal freedom 
for others, and the capacity to contribute to the justice of one’s society and one’s world”). 
113 Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (2005) 
(“Second-order diversity seeks variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them.  It 
favors interorganizational diversity, not intraorganizational diversity.”); see also Heather K. 
Gerken, Dissenting By Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1754 (2005) (arguing that 
dissenting by deciding “fus[es] an act of contestation with an act of affiliation”). 
114 See Gerken, supra note 113, at 1103 (positing that “[second-order diversity] fosters 
diversity without mandating uniformity”). 
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elite and popular conceptions of constitutional life; it is a place where the deep 
structures of law and politics converge.  Popular features of legal language 
represent traces of self-rule. 
The rich and the poor, the formally educated and the self-taught, all have an 
authorial role in American democracy.  But it begins with the basic nature of 
governing language.  It is this realization that turns the multiplicity of voices 
and background experiences from a potential threat to order and unity into a 
reservoir of strength. 
What others have derided as lowbrow features of our law115 are, in fact, 
nothing of the sort.  Just as Hamilton and his compatriots engaged the citizenry 
in their day by mixing common ways with high-minded abstractions, so 
metaphor today invigorates political participation according to an equivalent 
formula. 
C. Enhancing Accountability 
So far, it has been my goal to unveil metaphor’s harmonic force and its open 
texture.  If metaphor is uniquely accessible to average citizens, it then follows 
that the device is not only understood by the people, but can also be acted upon 
by them.  It is in this sense that constitutional vernacular’s participatory 
dimension reveals its greatest strength: its capacity to enhance political 
accountability in the law.  Because a judge’s every statement is buoyed by 
politics, constitutional language is constantly enmeshed in and inevitably 
enriched by what occurs beyond law’s borders.  In fulfilling this authorship-
enhancing function, governing discourse necessarily reveals its disharmonic 
properties. 
The hallmarks of democracies are receptivity to self-critique and belief in 
the perfectability of the polity.  Figurative language creates bite-sized units of 
constitutional knowledge for these tasks.  These units, in turn, facilitate the 
efficient exchange and sharpening of political ideas.  As citizens make use of 
common rhetorical-political forms, they develop basic skills necessary to the 
day-to-day practice of self-government. 
Recalibration of legal language transpires not only during litigation, as 
parties press competing constructions of law upon the courts, but also through 
popular mobilization, which alters the very field from which judges cull their 
raw material.  Consider two prominent historical examples of democratic self-
115 See, e.g., LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 4-5 (1967) (calling the concept of legal fiction 
a “skeleton in the family of the law [that should] be taken from its closet and examined 
thoroughly”); 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, 
Marshall, & Co. 1843) (“[L]ying and nonsense compose the groundwork of English 
judicature . . . in English law, fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into 
every part of the system the principle of rottenness.”); Thomas Morawetz, Metaphor and 
Method: How Not to Think About Constitutional Interpretation, 27 CONN. L. REV. 227, 230 
(1994) (“Clear thinking about the roles of social goals, evolving history, and originalist 
admonitions in decision-making require that we resist the lure of metaphor.”). 
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critique: the first by social liberals, the second by social conservatives.  Each 
illustrates the layered nature of democratic dialogue and the generative power 
of constitutional vernacular. 
1. Civil Rights Revivalism 
One can discern metaphor’s permeable structure most vividly in the crafting 
and extension of the “meeting” or “assembly” metaphor which spurred 
innovations in democratic culture in the 1960s.  Building on the gains of 
progressivism, union organizers in this country built a mighty grass-roots 
movement on the model of the “army” and the “town meeting.”116  Alternative 
models of participatory democracy (e.g., anti-war, feminist, and black civil 
rights) then flourished to tackle a widening circle of social ills.  As one 
Students for a Democratic Society (“SDS”) member exclaimed in 1965 at the 
height of the civil rights movement, “freedom is an endless meeting.”117  
Churches served as the sites of democratic renewal, and when those 
institutions were not open or available, the people conducted “mass meetings 
in pool rooms, taverns and wherever else [they could] get an audience.”118
Alternative assemblies were conducted openly and notoriously in order to 
highlight a contrast-community existing alongside the exclusionary legal order, 
but also to underscore the values of equality, mutual sacrifice, and reason, 
which they believed were not presently reflected in the law.  A new mythology 
of equality was being built from the ground up – through incidents, anecdotes, 
songs, and sayings.  Call this the formation of a democratic sub-culture. 
To many inspired to take the streets or to commandeer segregated diners and 
buses, the entire civil rights experience had the air of an extended revival 
meeting.119  This image became fixed squarely in the political imagination.  
The Montgomery bus boycott of March 1956 was managed in a series of “mass 
meetings” – nearly four thousand people were present to reject an early end to 
the boycott, signaling a collective intent to press on.120  On August 28, 1963, 
116 FRANCESCA POLLETTA, DEMOCRACY IS AN ENDLESS MEETING 30 (2002). 
117 Id. at 1 (quoting an unidentified SDS member). 
118 Id. at 67-68 (quoting a Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee organizer in 
Batesville, Mississippi).  As Polletta explains, organizations like SDS self-consciously 
organized as a participatory democracy, and many members felt renewed faith in self-
government through their efforts at home and in the streets.  Id. at 69-71. 
119 David Chappell’s study recovers the prophetic ideas that made the black civil rights 
experience soar.  At some meetings, people would give speeches, speak in tongues, heal the 
sick, and invite the spirit of the Lord.  The encounters between the protesters and the police 
were often seen as miracles that they did not produce more violence.  See DAVID L. 
CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW 92-96 
(2004). 
120 L.D. Reddick, The Bus Boycott in Montgomery, reprinted in 1 REPORTING CIVIL 
RIGHTS 252, 264 (2003) (relating how the boycotters “manifested their collective will” by 
voting to continue the boycott); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE 
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the rhetorical strategy reached its crescendo: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s riveting 
oration on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial now recapitulated the meeting 
metaphor as the Eucharistic banquet.  In so doing, he not only broadened the 
civic gathering to encompass the Nation as a whole, but also claimed the 
values of kinship, difference, and forgiveness as democratic virtues: 
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true 
meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal.”  I have a dream that one day on the red hills of 
Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners 
will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.121
Seizing the moment, democratic vernacular now shifted in tone from 
opposition to reconciliation,122 from promises unfulfilled to opportunities 
regained.  In this way, mobilization rhetoric invited cooptation by governing 
discourse.123
Saturation of popular culture with images of people assembling out of doors 
eventually redirected the path of constitutional language.  Through popular 
idiom, the people rendered law first relevant, then accountable.  If law is a 
political-cultural system, then metaphor acts as a chokepoint – an entry point to 
that order, a place where pressure and influence may be most effectively 
applied.  The reform-oriented rhetoric of discontent would become absorbed 
by the law, thereby reinvigorating it.  The voices of rage, deprived of an 
audience, would be increasingly marginalized. 
In a series of path-breaking cases, protests in the streets and lunch counter 
sit-ins forced a collision of political rhetoric and indifferent, even hostile, legal 
KING YEARS 1954-63, 136, 139-43 (1988) (recounting mass meetings in Montgomery).   
“The mass meeting pattern [was] relatively simple: songs, prayer, latest news and plans, a 
‘pep talk,’ collection.”  Reddick, supra, at 257.   
121 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), available at 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/Ihaveadream.htm.  
122 Id.  The theme of a unified and determined march toward legal justice runs 
throughout the speech.  In addition to the ancient image of table fellowship, King urged 
listeners not to “satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and 
hatred; to not allow the “marvelous new militancy . . . [to] lead us to a distrust of all white 
people;” and to instead use their faith in the law to “transform the jangling discords of our 
nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood.”  Id. 
123 King’s speech unleashed a flurry of vibrant political and religious metaphors.  
Making clear the goals of the movement, King accused America of “giv[ing] the Negro 
people a bad check” and stated that “we’ve come to cash this check, a check that will give 
us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice.”  Id.  Portraying justice as 
an inevitable product of the struggle, he contrasted “the sweltering summer of the Negro’s 
legitimate discontent” with “an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality.”  Id.  Then, 
quoting the Book of Amos, he urged his listeners to work until “‘justice rolls down like 
waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream.’” Id. (quoting Amos 5:24 (American 
Standard Version)). 
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infrastructure.124  Litigants brought cases to prompt not only reconsideration of 
legal rules, but also the very recalibration of constitutional language.  The 
effect was to revolutionize not only the High Court’s conception of free 
expression, but also the very notion of political community.125  Each time, 
direct action and trial strategies – some coordinated, at other occasions 
overlapping in timing and objectives126 – prompted a further institutional 
elaboration of these metaphors in First Amendment law, as jurists described 
these activities as evincing elements of “deliberation,” “order,” and 
“exchange.”127  As I have argued elsewhere, the incongruity between the 
populist, deliberative imagery spun in each of these controversies and the 
actual facts demonstrates both that small-scale art has tremendous staying 
power and that judicial discourse is subject to popular control.128
Concomitantly, the political branches acted to transform purely private sites 
nurturing discrimination into institutions re-dedicated to the principle of equal 
citizenship.  Here, too, the civil rights laws can be seen as a codification of 
mobilized rhetoric: “public accommodations” would now stand forever as 
living symbols of constitutional justice, where citizens can freely congregate, 
go about their business, and even exchange ideas. 
Indeed, the civil rights experience reveals that the importance of 
foundational language to the life of a social movement can be mapped along a 
124 Taking to the streets and rhetorical strategy have traditionally gone hand in hand.  See 
Gary Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 410 (2005). 
125 See id. 
126 For a thoughtful discussion of the sometimes divergent goals of lawyers and activists, 
see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative 
Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1443 (2005) (exploring “the tension between litigation 
and social movement tactics”).  On the conflicts between public interest lawyers and the 
communities they purport to serve, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: 
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 
YALE L.J. 1623, 1627-43 (1997). 
127 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (upholding the constitutionality 
of Louisiana’s statute that prohibited picketing near a courthouse, but reversing defendant’s 
conviction for picketing during a civil rights rally because he had received permission from 
police chief); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (reversing breach of the 
peace convictions of black students who had participated in a peaceable civil rights protest 
at the statehouse on free speech and assembly grounds); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961) (invalidating statute that required each local 
organization affiliated with an out-of-state association to file an affidavit that none of its 
members belonged to “subversive organizations”). 
128 Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, supra note 8, at 212-15 
(arguing that these rulings “captured the legal principle that thinking people will not be 
presumed to rush to violence or illegal activity at the drop of an inflammatory word,” and 
also that the rulings “introduced inventive images, counter-scripts, and categories of 
meaning to a new generation of constitutional actors”); see also, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); Gremillion, 366 U.S. at 297. 
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timeline: • In the first stage, rhetoric facilitates a group’s self-organization, 
recruitment, identity, and solidarity.  Discursive practices are 
focused on internal rather than external goals.129 • Spontaneous efforts at direct action begin.  As a group reaches a 
critical mass, it splits and multiplies into other groups, each with its 
own identity, membership, and agenda.  Metaphors proliferate in 
the second stage.  Conceptual and linguistic competition 
commences. • Only through common purpose and shared language can factions 
unite.  Thematic coherence increases.  A movement arises when 
such a coalition formulates a new message to engage with political 
institutions and an external target audience.130  At this third stage, 
figurative discourse facilitates a democratic counter-culture, gaining 
in popularity yet opposed to aspects of civic life and not yet 
enjoying recognition or decisive sway over public policy. • In the fourth stage, the movement’s symbolic acts achieve 
validation through institutional cooptation.  Freedom is now 
recognized as everybody’s cause or everybody’s failure.131  Words, 
phrases, and ideas embraced by elected officials and courts of last 
resort reflect the universality of the heretofore contested principle – 
129 Herbert Simons explains that a social movement must accomplish three tasks: (1) 
attract, maintain, and mold workers into an efficiently organized unit; (2) secure adoption of 
their product by the larger social structure; and (3) react to resistance generated by the larger 
structure.  Herbert W. Simons, Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of 
Persuasion for Social Movements, in READINGS ON THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL PROTEST 34, 
35-36 (Charles E. Morris III & Stephen H. Browne eds., 2001); see also DAVID SNOWBALL, 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE RHETORIC OF THE MORAL MAJORITY 66-71 (1991) 
(observing that mobilization rhetoric initially makes claims that political action is effective, 
legitimate, and necessary). 
130 Shifting toward externally-directed functions, Charles Stewart has stressed the 
importance of transforming perceptions of history, transforming perceptions of society, 
prescribing courses of action, mobilizing the discontented, pressuring the opposition, and 
maintaining the visibility of a movement.  Charles J. Stewart, A Functional Approach to the 
Rhetoric of Social Movements, in READINGS ON THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL PROTEST, supra 
note 129, at 167-68. 
131 For example, see President John F. Kennedy’s June 11, 1963, civil rights address, in 
which he argued that discrimination “is not a sectional issue . . . [nor] even a legal or 
legislative issue alone.”  President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the 
American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at  
http://www.jfklibrary.org/j061163.htm.  He then reasserted the importance of the rule of 
law: “It is better to settle these matters in the courts than on the streets, and new laws are 
needed at every level.”  Id.  Finally, he wove law, religion, and morality into a new whole: 
“We are confronted primarily with a moral issue.  It is as old as the scriptures and is as clear 
as the American Constitution.”  Id. 
 34 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1 
 
 
these speech-acts are incorporated into official or ruling discourse, 
becoming indistinguishable from the legal norms with which they 
have been associated.  The language of mobilization and change 
becomes the mechanism of norms-enforcement. • The fifth stage is transitional.  Every successful project in 
constitutional lexicon-building inspires mimics and detractors.132  
The cycle of constitutional politics begins anew. 
Consider another example.  In opposition to the older patriarchal order and 
in building upon the gains of the New Deal-New Frontier coalition, second-
wave feminism sought greater control over the decisions that affected women’s 
daily lives (stages 1 through 3).133  Roe v. Wade represents not only a 
culmination of doctrinal developments since Griswold v. Connecticut, but also 
a harmonization of discursive trends in the political and legal domains (stage 
4).  This period of settlement is marked by bureaucratic efforts to impose 
rhetorical and physical order on social practice. 
But governing language can remain stable only for so long.  The fragile 
congruence between public attention, ruling idiom, and popular ethos begins to 
dissipate.  New popular movements inevitably claim to speak on behalf of the 
people, aiming to either extend existing gains or to curb perceived excesses.  
These informal organizations will nourish their own discourses, along with 
132 As Stuart Scheingold puts it, legal enactments “can lay the basis for a collective 
political identity, since the entitlements provide a joint stake and the deprivations a mutual 
cause.  In sum, litigation can politicize individual discontents and in so doing activate a 
constituency, thus lending initial impetus to a movement for change.”  STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
136-37 (1974); see also JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERESTS 20-21 (1996) 
(discussing the forms of law in politics – rights, institutional realism, ideology of remedy, 
and radical consciousness – that are “so distinctive that they define a movement’s 
conventions”). 
133 By contrast, first-wave feminism organized around the right to suffrage.  Second-
wave feminism’s legacy, like that of the black civil rights movement, can be traced in civil 
rights laws from the Equal Pay Act of 1963 to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1973.  
As Reva Siegel argues, “[c]laims on the text of the Constitution made by mobilized groups 
of Americans outside the courthouse helped bring into being the understandings that judges 
then read into the text of the Constitution.”  Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 312-13 (2001).  
See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986) (detailing the failed 
efforts to ratify a constitutional amendment banning government sex discrimination); SARA 
EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979) (recounting the efforts to redefine cultural views 
restricting women to the twin roles of mother and homemaker); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS 
OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS (1975) (analyzing how the women’s liberation movement 
has shaped public policy toward women); JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF 
FEMINISM (1971) (discussing the revival of feminist movements in the 1960s and their 
efforts to achieve private and public equality for women).
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related frames of understanding through which to visualize and appreciate the 
stakes of democratic conflict.  Official characterization of abortion in the 
language of privacy spurred the formation of new social groups bent on 
toppling the legal-linguistic regime (stage 5), which they believe fostered a 
“culture of death”; in its stead, the religious revival promises a “culture of 
life.”134
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey represents an 
important weigh station along this journey, as the rhetoric of second-wave 
feminism recombined with the right-to-life movement’s emphasis on the 
sanctity of every human life.  In language cognizable only against the backdrop 
of political struggle, the Court acknowledges that pregnancy requires unique 
“sacrifices” and is inextricably bound with the “destiny of the woman.”135  At 
the same time, the state has a “profound interest in potential life,” which is 
now said to extend throughout pregnancy.136  “These principles do not 
contradict one another,” the Court insists.137
The election of George W. Bush, along with the appointment of 
ideologically-compatible jurists across three Republican administrations does 
not ensure the ultimate success of the conservative movement.138  It does, 
however, dramatically alter the fields within which constitutional language is 
fiercely contested and produced. 
2. The Anti-Separationist Movement 
Over the last thirty years, the country has been roiled by an intense debate 
over the proper role of religion in public life.  This has played out on a number 
of fronts simultaneously.  A particularly potent metaphor – the “wall of 
separation between church and state”139 – has galvanized opposition to the 
Warren Court’s legacy while sparking a popular sense of moral renewal.  A 
“high and impregnable” wall was essential, Justice Hugo Black famously 
wrote in Everson v. Board of Education,140 to avoid the “turmoil, civil strife, 
134 E.g. Robin Toner, Pope May Color Debate in U.S. Over “Life” Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2005, at A1 (reporting a conservative appeal to U.S. Catholics on “culture of life” 
issues – abortion, euthanasia, and stem cell research). 
135  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
136 Id. at 878. 
137 Id. at 846. 
138 The expectations of those committed to a strategy of ideological shift through 
personnel changes can be very high.  As one senator exclaimed during the confirmation 
hearings of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., the day Roberts’s nomination was sent to the floor: 
“This may be, I hope, a turning point in our legal system.”  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Panel 
Approves Roberts, 13-5, as 3 of 8 Democrats Back Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at A1. 
139 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (quoting a letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association); see infra notes 148-149 and accompanying 
text. 
140 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 36 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1 
 
 
and persecutions” that plagued the colonists’ forebears.141 Accordingly, “[w]e 
could not approve the slightest breach.”142
At first, enraged conservatives tried to dismantle the wall itself.  Predictably, 
their opening gambit was to insist that the wall was purely a judicial 
fabrication without basis in the Nation’s political tradition.143  In recent years, 
as the frontal assault on the iconic wall proved ineffective, their strategy has 
shifted toward seeking a more porous membrane between government and the 
private realm.144  Increasingly, conservatives have accepted that the wall – in 
one form or another – will persist.  Rather than challenge the wall directly, 
they have argued that the “wall of separation” has been transformed by 
unelected magistrates into a “wall of religious oppression.”145
So argued then-Senator John Ashcroft in 1988 before a gathering of the 
Christian Coalition.  Later, as Attorney General, he would take the symbolic 
step of holding regular prayer breakfasts for Justice Department staff.146  In 
September 2004, Jim Towey, Director of the White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives, made a similar argument: “The separation of 
church and state is very important but we also recognize that that wall 
141 Id. at 8.  Although the Court first called the wall metaphor an “authoritative 
declaration of the scope and effect of the [First] [A]mendment” in Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), there was no further mention of it in the Court’s opinions until 
Everson, more than a generation later. 
142 Id. at 18; see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (stating that an 
earlier case in which the state had used tax-supported property for religious purposes 
“breach[ed] the ‘wall of separation’”); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (invoking wall metaphor); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) 
(concluding that public school sponsored prayer “breaches the constitutional wall of 
separation”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961) (invoking wall metaphor in 
striking down religious oath requirement to become notary public); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U.S. 599, 604 (1961) (citing wall metaphor as proper encapsulation of law); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961) (same); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 
U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (“[T]he First Amendment’s language, properly interpreted, had erected 
a wall of separation between Church and State.”). 
143 See, e.g., ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT 
AND CURRENT FICTION 49-82 (1982) (arguing that “the First Amendment did not, nor was it 
intended to, create a ‘high’ and ‘impregnable’ wall between Church and State.”). 
144 Stephen Carter, for example, has argued that “in order to make the Founders’ vision 
compatible with the structure and needs of modern society, the wall has to have a few doors 
in it.”  STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 109 (1993). 
145 In 1988, then-Senator John Ashcroft reportedly told a meeting of the Christian 
Coalition that “a robed elite have taken the wall of separation designed to protect the church 
and they have made it a wall of religious oppression.”  Dan Eggen, Ashcroft’s Faith Plays 
Visible Role at Justice; Bible Sessions with Staffers Draw Questions and Criticism, WASH. 
POST, May 14, 2001, at A1. 
146 Id.; see supra note 145. 
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separating the poor from effective programs had to come down.”147  The wall 
that once symbolized progress had hardened into a totem to suffering.  Built to 
preserve and nurture liberty, it is now said to stifle human interaction and 
political innovation. 
Social conservatives realized that there was always something jarring about 
this constitutive metaphor.  Although the Everson opinion quoted the “wall of 
separation” language of Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association,148 it was Roger Williams who first wrote that in order “to restore 
[God’s] Garden and Paradise” individuals should “be walled in unto [God] 
from the world.”149  Whereas Williams’s metaphor painted a picture of the 
citizenry nurtured within the walls, Justice Black’s rendering separated the 
instruments of political authority from the people themselves, who are 
metaphorically banished beyond the wall.  This wall has always been 
vulnerable to charges of elitism; it seems to defy the spirit of civic 
republicanism. 
A wall that keeps the righteous from their sacred inheritance has generative 
force in a country populated by the God-fearing.150  This change in discursive 
practice is part of a broader agenda to transform public perception of an actual 
religious majority into a political minority.  People of faith, this mobilized 
community insists, are excluded from the public square through the excesses of 
liberalism and secularism.151  Conceived in law, the wall has become the 
147 Adelle M. Banks, Adviser: Bush “Mainstream” in His Faith; Politics: Pastor Says 
President Hasn’t Received Divine Orders on War, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Cal.), 
Sept. 11, 2004, at A15. 
148 Everson, 330 U.S. 1 at 16. 
149 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 45 (2002).  As Philip 
Hamburger recounts, the separationist drive emerged in earnest in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, as Protestants sought to prevent the Catholic Church from exercising 
political and religious clout.  Advocates argued that affairs of the state must be kept 
“distinct” from and “unconnected” to religious life, with each sphere to retain its “purity.”  
Id. at 221-23 (citations omitted).  In particular, during a pitched battle over whether New 
York City sectarian schools should receive public funds, the American Republicans argued: 
“Our sole object is to form a barrier high and eternal as the Andes, which shall forever 
separate the Church from the State.”  Id. at 228. 
150 The connections between belief in religion and belief in the rule of law run deep.  A 
recent Harris poll showed that over ninety percent of Americans believe in God, and a 
similarly overwhelming majority believe in miracles, the afterlife, and other expressions of 
divinity.  See Humphrey Taylor, The Religious and Other Beliefs of Americans 2003, THE 
HARRIS POLL #11, Feb. 26, 2003, 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=359.  In the evocative story of 
Jericho, whose inhabitants “had shut and barricaded its gates (against the Israelites),” God 
instructs Joshua to march around the city seven times on seven successive days.  At the 
completion of this cycle, and “[w]hen the ram’s horn sounds . . . the entire people must utter 
a mighty war cry and the city wall will collapse then and there.”  Joshua 6:1-5 (New 
Jerusalem).  
151 Republican Senators have in recent months systematically decried Democratic 
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antithesis of law. 
Ingeniously, by making the iconic wall seem impregnable, social 
conservatives have turned separationists’ strength into a weakness.  Because 
second-order metaphors are so tacky, so enmeshed with democratic principles, 
this political-rhetorical strategy has softened social support for not only the 
dominant liberty metaphor of the last constitutional regime, but also the legal 
machinery with which it has been associated.  A byproduct of this process of 
delegitimation has been institutional indecisiveness, then doctrinal 
incoherence, and now implicit abandonment of the Lemon test.152
Civil libertarians have cheerfully if unwittingly enabled this strategy every 
time they have demanded that this symbolic wall be made “high and strong.”153  
To be sure, the idea of rights as bulwark has a long pedigree in our 
constitutional tradition.154  All this tells us, however, is that a legal concept or 
opposition to certain judicial candidates as emblematic of hostility to “people of faith.”  See 
David D. Kirkpatrick & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Frist is Drawing Criticism from Some Church 
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A18 (describing a telecast on radio and television 
themed “The Filibuster Against People of Faith”). 
152 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005), in which the Court 
explained: “Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive 
monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.” Id.; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971)).  Further marginalizing the rule, the Court stated that although “we have 
sometimes pointed to Lemon v. Kurtzman as providing the governing test . . . .  [m]any of 
our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test.”  Id. at 2860-61 (citation omitted).  
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736 (2005), the Court appeared to 
relax the religious purpose prong by requiring that a state’s motive be “predominantly” to 
advance religion before it may be enjoined.  Id. 
153 Press Release, ACLU, Kansas County Official Abused Position By Mailing Bible 
Tracts, Attacking Citizens’s [sic] Beliefs, ACLU Says (Aug. 30, 2000), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/religion/govtfunding/16302prs20000830.html; accord Press Release, 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Rep. Delay Calls Faith-Based 
Initiative an Opportunity to “Rebuke Church-State Separation” (July 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=pr&page=NewsArticle&id=6045&security=1002&new
s_iv_ctrl=1381 (quoting Barry Lynn, Executive Director, to the effect that the 
administration’s faith-based initiative is a “crusade to force government-sponsored religion 
onto the American people and demolish the wall of separation between church and state”). 
154 For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Justice Jackson 
stated: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.  One’s 
right to . . . freedom of worship and assembly . . . may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections. 
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 4, at 503, 508 (calling courts of justice an “excellent barrier to the encroachments and 
oppressions of the representative body” and “bulwarks of a limited Constitution”).  For a 
sharply pessimistic account of boundary metaphors, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, 
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turn of phrase is theoretically available; it cannot predict whether or when it 
will resonate with the populace or influence legal norms. 
Given the coordinated strategies to make the wall a focus of social 
mobilization and public debate, it was only a matter of time before the law 
absorbed the heightened political sentiment against the symbolic boundary.  
Not only have a number of jurists expressed outright hostility toward the wall 
of separation,155 the High Court has increasingly eschewed the trope in its 
authoritative resolutions.156  This is especially telling in cases that actually 
favored the anti-establishment position.157
As late as 1982, Chief Justice Warren Burger confessed in Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den158 that the “the concept of a ‘wall’ of separation is a useful 
signpost.”159  Reflecting the fact that the locus of governing discourse had 
begun to shift in response to society’s rightward tilt, just two years later he 
wrote: 
The concept of a “wall” of separation is a useful figure of speech 
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson.  The metaphor has 
served as a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established 
church or anything approaching it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly 
accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact 
Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 162 (Robert C. Post 
ed., 1991) (arguing that the boundary metaphor is “destructive” in the degree to which it 
obscures communal relationships). 
155 E.g. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The 
‘wall of separation between church and State’ is a metaphor based on bad history, a 
metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging.  It should be frankly and explicitly 
abandoned.”). 
156 Recently, proponents of the wall of separation have been able to invoke it only in 
separate opinions.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 873 (2000) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he record in this case illustrates the importance of rebuilding the ‘wall of separation 
between church and State’ that Jefferson envisioned.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600-
01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church 
and State.’” (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))); Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same). 
157 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); Weisman, 505 U.S. 
at 598. 
158 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that a Massachusetts law giving schools and churches 
veto power over liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius violates the Establishment Clause). 
159 Id. at 123.  In 1977, the Court wrote: “We have acknowledged before, and we do so 
again here, that the wall of separation that must be maintained between church and state ‘is 
a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship.’  Nonetheless, the Court’s numerous precedents ‘have become firmly rooted.’”  
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (citations omitted).   
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exists between church and state.160
Elevating the mobilized conservative critique into law, he explained that: 
No significant segment of our society and no institution within it can exist 
in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, 
much less from government. . . . Anything less would require the ‘callous 
indifference’ we have said was never intended by the Establishment 
Clause.”161
Here, the image of the unitary body politic was set in opposition to the 
boundary metaphor in order to undermine it. 
Utilizing the same basic strategy, Justice Anthony Kennedy has observed 
that “enforced recognition of only the secular . . . would signal not neutrality 
but a pervasive intent to insulate government from all things religious.”162  For 
him, boundaries matter but only insofar as they serve to “guard and respect that 
sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of a free 
people.”163  The message is unmistakable: a creation of the mind, the wall 
should serve the mind rather than effectuate the physical segregation of the 
religious community. 
For religious conservatives, as it had been with civil rights activists, 
metaphor served as the chief site of constitutional in-fighting.  A social 
movement was organized in response to perceptions of diminished social 
worth and political clout; sympathetic officials were elected and appointed; 
and the rhetoric of governing elites was significantly recast.  In both situations, 
figurative discourse motivated and enabled popular control of foundational 
principles. 
The peculiarly porous character of American constitutional language 
presents distinct tradeoffs.  One risk is that a highly determined segment of the 
populace can set the terms of debate, and with a little luck, shift the locus of 
governing rhetoric.  Political elites (including judges) can mistake the 
calibrated voices of lawyers and high-pitched pleas of activists for that of an 
160 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 
397 U.S. 664 (1970).  The Walz court stated, “No perfect or absolute separation is really 
possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts – one that 
seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.”  Id. at 670.  “[The exemption] 
restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and 
reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other.  Separation in this context 
cannot mean absence of all contact; the complexities of modern life inevitably produce 
some contact . . . .”  Id. at 676. 
161 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (emphasis added). 
162 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657, 663-64 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (“A categorical 
approach would install federal courts as jealous guardians of an absolute ‘wall of 
separation,’ sending a clear message of disapproval.”).  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White and Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  Id. at 655. 
163 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
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aroused citizenry in instances when they merely produce echo chamber effects.   
What is more, conceptual creep –a low grade, almost imperceptible shift in 
legal meaning – is not only a fact of life, but presents a perennial problem of 
institutional management.  The very forces seeking to tame the law from 
without can distort, destabilize, and displace accepted understandings. 
D. Repairing Rifts 
Law’s sense of stability is in perpetual danger of being breached.  War and 
revolution are the most cataclysmic events that destroy the necessary 
conditions for law to exist.  The appearance of law can be disrupted in other, 
less seismic ways.  Migration, economic swings, birth patterns, and popular 
culture all have a hand in destabilizing the social understandings that cement 
law’s hold on us. 
Political realities, too, are always, at some level, in flux: coalitions break 
down and new alliances must be made, public officials exhaust or squander 
their mandates, policy agendas are re-ordered with each election season.  These 
cultural and electoral developments constantly put pressure on dominant 
constitutional understandings.  For legal language to continue to ring true in 
the face of these challenges, it must alter its pitch or vary its tone. 
Principled judgment on the part of law’s stewards, including adherence to 
stare decisis, plays a crucial role in projecting law’s equilibrium.164  But it can 
only do so much – the appearance of principle is only one pillar of our belief in 
the law.  Much of the constitutional text is contestable.  For the average citizen, 
fidelity to existing doctrine is a hopelessly abstract morass.  Everyone claims 
to keep faith with the Framers, but who is right? 
Constitutional vernacular here serves as an additional mediating and 
stabilizing device.  Legal change is simultaneously facilitated and masked by 
familiar metaphors and idioms.  In this way, even the most significant changes 
to the polity are made familiar, sensible, and ultimately palatable among 
various constitutional constituencies.  I call metaphor’s capacity to render law 
seamless and timeless its reparative quality. 
If there is something counterintuitive for the modern citizen, exacerbated by 
moments when law appears out of touch with human concerns, it is the idea 
that one must be governed by another’s promises rather than one’s own.  
Resort to the figurative eases this anxiety.  It fosters citizens’ acceptance of 
164 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on 
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 588 (2001) (stating that stare decisis 
“promotes stability, protects settled expectations, and conserves judicial resources”); 
Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995) 
(making the case for the explicit consideration of the “appearance” of fairness in deciding 
whether stare decisis should compel continued adherence to a past legal rule); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 749-53 
(1988) (justifying stare decisis as a means to promote stability and to legitimate judicial 
review). 
 42 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1 
 
 
being ruled by past commitments, engendering intergenerational trust.  The 
very structure of governing discourse reminds the people that while there is no 
escape from the past, liberty comes from engagement and political renewal. 
By way of illustration, consider the tectonic, cross-doctrinal shift that can be 
traced from Bowers v. Hardwick165 to Romer v. Evans166 and finally to 
Lawrence v. Texas.167  For the legal technician, Bowers was puzzling, if not 
irrational.168  The definitional analysis should have come down to a choice 
between a holistic notion of privacy (e.g., autonomy over life-altering choices) 
and a more limited, act-based account of privacy (e.g., consensual sexual acts).  
Instead, the Court drew finer-grained distinctions that lent earlier cases a 
heterosexual gloss (not even Griswold, in its emphasis of the importance of 
marriage, dares to limit the logic of privacy to that institution alone).169
As dehumanizing a decision as Bowers was, however, from a cultural 
perspective the outcome could not have been entirely unexpected in the mid-
1980s.  There was certainly no authoritative language of gay equality – the 
words “gay” and “sexual orientation” themselves barely appeared in the legal 
lexicon.170  Griswold notwithstanding, from the standpoint of existing 
165 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
166 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
167 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
168 Reaction to Bowers was swift and hostile.  See Daniel O. Conkle, The Second Death 
of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 215-16 (1987) (asserting that Bowers 
“deviat[ed] sharply from the Court’s own precedents”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of 
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747-48 (1989) (observing that after “briefly waving the 
standard of judicial objectivity,” the analysis quickly devolved into judgment that 
homosexual sex “is either less fundamental or more unsavory than the activities protected in 
prior cases”); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal 
Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648, 649 (1987) (“[T]he Court’s opinion . . . rests upon 
nothing more substantial than the collective distaste of the five justices in the majority for 
the conduct under scrutiny.”); Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1523 (1989) (“Had the majority examined the regulated conduct in 
Hardwick at the same level of generality employed in previous privacy decisions, it would 
have found constitutional protection for private, consensual, same-sex sodomy.”).   
169 Only three Justices – Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan – would have rooted the right in 
the concept of “marital relation” alone.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
170 “Sexual orientation” as a phrase referring to an individual’s sexual preference or 
status appears only once in the U.S. Reports before Bowers, in a lonely dissent from a denial 
of certiorari.  Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1017 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (taking colleagues to task for not 
considering whether dismissal of high school guidance counselor for acknowledging her 
bisexuality violated the First Amendment).  Usage of the word “gay” as a reference to 
homosexuality was equally scarce.  But see, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. 
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 passim (1987) (upholding law that 
prevented use of the word “Olympics” in corporation’s “Gay Olympics” competition); 
Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of 
 2006] DEMOCRACY’S HANDMAID 43 
 
 
rhetorical materials, there was little with which to work. 
Gays and lesbians became increasingly visible and politically mobilized in 
American life during the last twenty years, thereby threatening a serious 
disjunction.  The Romer Court itself recognized these whirlwind changes, 
noting the rapid enactment of anti-discrimination laws in many localities.171  
By the late 1990s, a monolithic moral-legal framework excluding sexual 
minorities from the polity could not be blindly asserted as rational, any more 
than racial discrimination could be asserted as rational by the 1960s.172  The 
position now had to be articulated and defended.  That vision – at least in its 
most virulent form – was finally rejected in Lawrence. 
Now consider more carefully metaphor’s role in this progression.  In 
Bowers, the Supreme Court repeatedly deployed the famed law-as-tree 
metaphor173 in rejecting Michael Hardwick’s claim that the right to privacy 
shielded him from prosecution.  The Justices asserted both that there was no 
“deeply rooted” right to engage in same-sex sodomy and that “[p]roscriptions 
against that conduct have ancient roots.”174  The Court thus raised the image of 
the law as a towering oak, imbuing Georgia’s sovereign act to mark and isolate 
Hardwick with historical heft.  It simultaneously characterized the individual’s 
claim as rootless and as an illegitimate attempt to engraft a new right, rather 
than as a seamless extension of existing doctrine.175
Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence went further, offering an alternative, 
more terrifying metaphor.  Harkening to Blackstone, he described same-sex 
sodomy as a “deeper malignity” than rape.176  Rape strikes at the very center of 
civilization and its specter has long been used to inflame the populace.  The 
image-schema of the body did double duty here.  First, blurring the difference 
between sodomy and rape infused the act with a misleading sense of 
invasiveness, coercion, and searing emotional harm, for the statute under 
review forbade consensual sex as well as involuntary sexual acts. 
Second, Burger’s metaphor cast homosexuals as a moral contagion – direct 
threats to the state necessitating an aggressive course of treatment.  
certiorari) (describing university’s reaction to student group advancing “gay liberation”). 
171 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24 (chronicling local anti-discrimination ordinances that 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
172 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding “no legitimate overriding 
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” that would justify the racial 
classifications created by Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute). 
173 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). 
174 Id. at 192; see id. at 194 (suggesting that the claimed right to privacy has “little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution”). 
175 See id. at 194 (“[T]o claim that a right to engage in [homosexual sodomy] is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, 
at best, facetious.”). 
176 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 
COMMENTARIES *215). 
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Collectively, the metaphors of the body and the tree in Bowers legitimated 
intrusive, “ancient” criminal laws aimed at subordinating, isolating, and 
disciplining sexual minorities.177
In excluding these individuals from the polity so completely, the ruling 
demanded a sharp division of the self into the personal (unprotected) and the 
political (protected).  The highest law of the land now endorsed an unforgiving 
policy: in order to enjoy civic equality, one had to deny oneself.178  This 
proved inconsistent with principles of self-determination to many, and for this 
reason Bowers provoked collective reflection, and then incited a counter-
movement.179
A decade later, in Romer, the iconographic battleground had shifted: now, 
the most important second-order metaphors worked to the benefit of sexual 
minorities.  The metaphor of the body made its reappearance, but unlike 
Justice Burger’s version in Bowers, the threat to the integrity of the body 
politic came not from the individual, but from the state. 
According to Justice Kennedy, Colorado’s “Amendment 2” imposed a 
“special disability,” a “broad and undifferentiated disability,” on homosexuals 
alone.180  In a move reminiscent of the Framers’ own, the Court disentangled 
the image-schema of the body from the state itself, and re-imagined it as short-
hand for the people of the state themselves.  Re-mapping the conceptual target 
and source domains in this way conveyed the sense that the injury to gay 
citizens caused by the state constitutional provision was so grave that it was 
tantamount to losing a limb or otherwise suffering the impairment of a major 
life function.  The metaphor stressed continuity in the law while 
simultaneously humanizing the plaintiffs as artificially “disabled” by the law. 
Whereas Justice Burger’s use of the body excluded sexual minorities from 
the public sphere, the Romer Court’s use of the identical metaphor initiated 
their re-integration into “ordinary civic life in a free society.”181  All of this 
was accomplished without directly mentioning Bowers at all. 
Nor was the harm posed by “Amendment 2”-style laws limited to the 
individuals themselves.  The measure was antithetical to the very ideal of self-
rule, captured in “the principle that government and each of its parts remain 
177 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
178 For a thoughtful discussion of Bowers and the dynamics of the closet, see Kenji 
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002). 
179 See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First 
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
319, 323 (1993) (“Bowers is to the growing gay rights movement what Plessy v. Ferguson 
was to the civil rights movement, and what Dred Scott v. Sandford was to the 
abolitionists.”). 
180 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (explaining that the constitutional 
amendment forbidding safeguards to homosexuals alone is so broad that it is “inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
181 Id. at 631. 
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open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”182  As the figural 
language suggested, the damage extended to the very institutions through 
which the people operationalize democracy.  Nullifying existing non-
discrimination laws and preemptively foreclosing the possibility of reform was 
no different from cutting off law from the lifeblood of democracy.  What the 
Court accomplished was nothing short of a transformation; its instrument of 
choice was an indigenous rhetorical form with tremendous staying power. 
Once the High Court signaled its desire to re-evaluate the privacy doctrine 
in Lawrence, the stakes for the law’s continued legitimacy could not be higher.  
Not only had social changes further weakened Bowers’ view of citizenship,183 
but the Romer decision – which never mentioned Bowers – opened deeper 
fissures between the social domains demarcated by the law of privacy and 
equal protection.  Technically, the rulings came in different doctrinal areas, but 
now the civic imagery of Romer was powerful and inspiring; it demanded a 
measure of reconciliation with past formulations of democratic community.  
The earlier decision cast gays and lesbians as secondary citizens; the decision 
of more recent vintage painted a picture of full citizenship.  Which vision 
would prevail? 
Two time-honored legal metaphors do the heavy lifting in Lawrence: the 
law-as-house and rights-as-bulwark.  While Justice Kennedy called Bowers 
wrong the day it was decided,184 his metaphors suggested otherwise.  First, 
casting Bowers as a ramshackle house, he stated that the precedent’s 
“foundations . . . have sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions in 
Casey and Romer.”185  Second, recalling law’s promise of well ordered liberty, 
he revived the barrier metaphor on the individuals’ behalf, reminding readers 
that “‘[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter.’”186  The move not only 
resuscitated society’s abiding belief in constitutional limits, but also cast the 
sexuality police as the outsiders.  Suddenly the police became interlopers on 
the outside looking in rather than guardians, beating futilely upon that 
formidable constitutional structure. 
A number of lessons can be drawn from this episode.  First, metaphor can 
be used effectively to de-legitimate a prior legal-political regime and hasten its 
182 Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
183 Darren Leonard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, 
Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 36-43 (2005) (discussing the social 
context of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 578 (2003), and arguing that public opinion 
supports the decriminalization of sodomy). 
184 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
185 Id. at 576.  Justice Kennedy’s description of the right to privacy in transcendental and 
universalistic terms was somewhat more distracting, though it, too, reinforced the 
transformative quality of the ruling. 
186 Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 
(1992)). 
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end.  After all, who could object to the razing of a decrepit house sitting on a 
rotting base when a little push was all it needed?  On this score, recall 
Madison’s own rendition of the constitution as a capacious house.  Urging 
fellow citizens not to succumb to the entreaties of naysayers, he exclaimed: 
No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm 
and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or 
because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the 
ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them.187
Madison’s metaphor of the Constitution-as-house played upon sympathetic 
accounts of the drafters as “skilful architects” who recommended a new roof 
for “a certain mansion house [which] was observed to be in a very bad 
condition.”188  Justice Kennedy’s version in Lawrence not only facilitated the 
quiet demolition of the older legal infrastructure, but also paved the way for 
the erection of a new wing devoted to the protection of sexual autonomy. 
Second, metaphoric tactics facilitated a seamless shift from a disfigured, 
heterosexualized right to privacy toward a thinly-conceived equal protection 
right,189 and then toward a resuscitated conception of substantive liberty.190  In 
the process, figurative language initially propelled the ritual exclusion of 
sexual minorities, and then facilitated their eventual reintegration into 
communal life. 
For the sake of communitas and the continuation of the republic, the law 
makes others’ sacrifices its own.  In order to preserve momentous, context-
smashing events, the law domesticates them.  Even as the people seek to 
reshape the law – to humanize it in each generation and turn it to their most 
pressing needs – the law first resists, then relents, and finally acts as if the 
outcome was pre-ordained all along. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF LEGAL CHANGE 
A sounder appreciation for metaphor’s role in statecraft refines our portrait 
187 THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 239-40. 
188 [Francis Hopkinson],“The New Roof”, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Phila.), Dec. 29, 
1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 662, 662.  In the 
parable recounted here, the architects are “servants of the family” who owned the house, 
while an old woman – Margery – was a tenant who “had long kept the house in confusion, 
and sown discord and discontent amongst the servants.”  Id. at 663.  See discussion supra 
Part III.E (revisiting role of the judge against these political understandings). 
189 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Lawfulness of Romer v. Evans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 241, 
256-57 (1998) (defending Romer’s “relatively limited scope,” which “does not ensure gays 
and lesbians (or any other group) success in seeking the protection of the laws”). 
190 I would not go as far as Randy Barnett, who sees in Lawrence a budding “libertarian 
revolution,” but I do quite agree with his insight that there is a self-conscious effort to 
escape the rhetorical confines of the then-existing privacy debate.  Randy E. Barnett, Justice 
Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 
(arguing that the “majority did not protect a ‘right of privacy’” but “protected liberty”). 
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of legal change.  The study of constitutive language illuminates the strengths 
and flaws of the dominant accounts of constitutional law.  It then points the 
way toward a richer account of transformative language. 
A. Matters of Text and History 
Textualists have the most in common with the monument builders of old, 
who hoped that their awe-inspiring creations could remain unsullied and “cut 
into the rock forever.”191  With the passing of Justice Hugo Black, strict 
textualists have trended toward extinction.  Those who remain have become 
reconstructed as modest originalists. 
Originalism posits that the substance of our foundational commitments is, or 
must be, fixed according to the wishes of their initial makers.  Because they 
were first in time, it is said, their outlook should be given priority over the 
preferences of the present generation.  Although originalist models proliferate 
in their details,192  they all share the belief that (a) something like a collective 
intention can be discerned from the historical tea leaves, and (b) if employed 
rigorously, this methodology can be said to constrain judicial decision-making 
in predictable ways. 
Beyond differences in the source of constraint (words as opposed to 
drafters’ beliefs), textualism and originalism can actually be said to share four 
characteristics: (1) subordination of present context and subtext to past text; (2) 
denial of a legitimate role for courts in facilitating democratic change; (3) 
preference for orderly process of legal change; and, hence, (4) skepticism of 
popular idioms. 
H. Jefferson Powell laments the “devaluations of the Constitution-as-
historical-document,” which provides “a common set of terms and expressions, 
almost a vocabulary and grammar, for political debate.”193  Yet after 
recognizing the generative force of language to make new forms out of old, 
Powell shifts back to classical textualist terrain: he argues that legitimate 
change happens through formal processes explicitly provided for in Article V, 
and “creative judicial explication of the existing text is no substitute.”194
191 Job 19:24 (New Jerusalem).  Larry Sager aptly describes originalism as a pure form 
of the agency model of constitutionalism, appealing in its simplicity of protocol, but 
ignoring important differences between ordinary legislation and foundational text.  
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE 16, 30-31 (2004). 
192 To take the sting out of originalism, some have searched for a more objective, more 
generalized, or more flexible originalist formulation.  See generally, e.g., KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); William Treanor, The Original Understanding of 
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). 
193 H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1428-29 (1986). 
194 Id. at 143. 
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It is certainly true that every constitutional struggle can be said to be about 
the text; in this sense, parchment surely does matter.  Still, no debate has been 
waged – much less won – through mere recitation and counter-recitation of the 
words actually contained in the founding document.  Far more important have 
been the extra-textual grammar, political iconography, and the moves and 
feints perfected during the course of such struggles.  As Powell’s later work 
suggests, writings have presented the occasions for and the starting point of 
dialogue, but cannot be said to determine or constrain constitutional debate.195
Even so, it is not at all clear that Powell’s second claim – that of textual 
superiority – is descriptively accurate.  Once we put aside the obvious glosses 
on text that are facially ludicrous, we must confront the fact that judicially-
produced text is no substitute for text if and only if the cultural support for 
constitutional norms can be said to be measurably different depending on their 
initial source.  From the standpoint of democratic theory, if a well-mobilized 
present day majority succeeds in securing faithful institutional reinterpretation 
of foundational commitments, such a development might very well represent a 
confirmation of self-determination, not a denial of it. 
There is, in fact, no decisive evidence that the initial source of constitutional 
language makes a significant difference in its cultural durability, at least in the 
long run.  The mantra, “separate is inherently unequal,” is a rallying cry of gay 
marriage advocates, and by all accounts the power of its logic remains 
undiminished by the fact that its source is Brown v. Board of Education196 
rather than the Equal Protection Clause itself. 
Cases such as Casey, Dickerson v. United States,197 or Grutter v. 
Bollinger198 are as much recognitions of the inscription of court-initiated sub-
constitutional modalities in the popular imagination as they are affirmations of 
the principle of stare decisis.  Any misgivings about the wisdom or legitimacy 
of their predecessor rulings among lawyers gave way to the reality that “the 
right to choose,”199 “the right to remain silent,”200 and demographic 
“diversity”201 have gained, rather than lost, institutional and social support 
195 H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. 
REV. 949, 950 (1993) (contending that the founding era’s greatest achievement was “the 
creation of a shared political and legal language that made reasoned debated possible”).  As 
Powell rightly points out, these habits do not produce determinate outcomes, and one must 
go “beyond the grammar of constitutional debate” to identify the depth and nature of our 
political commitments.  Id. at 1008-09. 
196 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
197 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
198 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
199 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (upholding the 
right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973)). 
200 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442 (upholding Miranda v. Arizona,  
396 U.S. 868 (1969)). 
201 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (upholding the affirmative action program of the University 
of Michigan Law School). 
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since their creation by jurists’ hands. 
Rhetorical inquiry reveals that incredible resources must be devoted to the 
originalist vision.  Proponents’ outright and frequent rejection of gradualism’s 
favorite metaphor betrays the suppressive quality of the enterprise.  Justice 
Scalia, for example, scoffs at the notion of a “[l]iving Constitution” at every 
opportunity.202  He denies even the possibility of legal change through the 
courts; for him, the Constitution is, and shall forever be, “rock solid, [and] 
unchanging.”203  He maintains this picture of the Constitution-as-given, though 
only by obscuring the authorship of the current generation and that of the 
judge.  For the originalist, the present is, and must continually be, consumed by 
the past; the subjugation of the living to the dead made complete.  Even to 
acknowledge, for a moment, the discretion to reconsider and elaborate is to 
tolerate “revisionis[m].”204
What the originalist actually means is that jurists are to act as seers, 
translating the wishes of those who were first in time.  In “new fields,” Scalia 
argues, “the Court must follow the trajectory of the [law],”205 implying not 
only doctrinal movement of its own volition rather than law created by human 
hands, but also the complete erasure of juridic autonomy.  When judges are 
doing their jobs, they are truly voiceless. 
But the originalist is the myth-maker who cannot appreciate the web he 
spins; he becomes hopelessly entangled in it.  As time passes, the elaborate 
fictions of a unitary original set of intentions dictating outcomes and the 
absence of juridic voice become more difficult to maintain.  Whatever more 
might be said about its normative appeal as a starting point, with the passage of 
time originalism loses credibility as an explanatory account of legal change.  
Context and subtext gain importance over time, while text – at least original 
text – becomes only one aspect of constitutional discourse.  It is one thing to 
call law a “rock”; it is quite another to believe it.   
B. The Limits of Gradualism 
If originalism effaces the authorship of the living, there is always the 
evolutionary alternative.  Benjamin Cardozo’s works The Nature of the 
Judicial Process and The Growth of the Law bear all the hallmarks of the 
standard gradualist account. 
To Cardozo, interpreting the Constitution is merely an exercise in common 
law jurisprudence on a grander scale.  The judge is an interstitial lawmaker 
who “supplements the declaration [of lawmakers], and fills the vacant spaces, 
by the same processes and methods that have built up the customary law.”206
202 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 41-47 (1997). 
203 See id. at 47. 
204 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 17 (1990). 
205 SCALIA, supra note 202, at 45 (emphasis added). 
206 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921). 
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The trouble is that most evolutionary models suffer from one of two general 
defects: they either over-represent judicial control of legal language or are too 
vague to be of much use.  Cardozo’s account admits of both flaws.  From the 
perspective of the gradualist: “Nothing is stable.  Nothing absolute.  All is fluid 
and changeable.  There is an endless ‘becoming.’”207  The law is seen as not 
merely porous, but as radically open-textured. Yet, ironically, gradualism 
clings to the belief that the jurist alone can preserve the locus of the law and 
direct its ultimate path – to “bring certainty and order out of the wilderness of 
precedent.”208  Where the originalist sees relative order, the gradualist sees 
general disorder.  Situated at the center of this dynamic of “perpetual flux” in 
the law, the judge is to extract – but not find – governing  principles and apply 
them.209  Utterly alone, the wise judge understands that “[t]here is nothing that 
can relieve us of ‘the pain of choosing at every step.’”210  All he can do is 
create workable legal doctrine as best he can.  Faced with crossroads at every 
turn, “[h]e must gather his wits, pluck up his courage, go forward one way or 
the other, and pray that he may be walking, not into ambush, morass, and 
darkness, but into safety, the open spaces, and the light.”211
Path dependence theories of law modify this image of relatively unbounded 
judicial lawmaking, positing that one’s doctrinal starting point sharply reduces 
the range of interpretive possibilities.212  Yet while path dependence slows the 
pace of legal change, the model shares its predecessor’s inward orientation.  It 
privileges factors endogenous to the system of justice (e.g., consistency, notice, 
sunk costs); any exogenous forces acting upon legal language remain at the 
periphery. 
In sum, the gradualist account is one of ceaseless motion coupled with an 
abiding faith in the jurist’s capacity to make periodic corrections to the 
trajectory of the law (which is taken to be the sum total of her responsibilities).  
What a cultural account reveals instead is a system of democratic parlance 
containing predictable structure accompanied by moments of fluidity.  In 
recycling democratic idioms, judges respond to external perceptions of 
legitimacy as much as concerns of doctrinal integrity and efficiency. 
C. Representation Reinforcement Redux 
Dissatisfaction with originalism’s monumental denial of legal change and 
gradualism’s open-endedness prompts us to circle back to Ely’s theory of 
207 Id. at 28. 
208 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 1 (1924). 
209 CARDOZO, supra note 206, at 28. 
210 CARDOZO, supra note 208,  at 67. 
211 Id. at 59. 
212 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern 
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (defining path 
dependence as the process by which “an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and 
systematic ways by the historical path leading to it”). 
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constitutionalism.213  If he is not shy about venturing beyond the text, Ely 
nevertheless chooses to operate within the paradigm of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty.  The tightrope he walks is treacherous: if he slips toward judicial 
lawmaking, he risks being savaged by those who hold dear the values of 
tradition and restraint; if he wavers in the direction of simple solutions, he may 
be mocked by interpretivists and historians.  His solution is to identify a single 
principle for judicial intervention, but otherwise leave it to political actors to 
effectuate change. 
Ely’s vision of democratic governance, in this sense, is rooted in a strategy 
of institutional specialization.  If foundational change is taking place, it is 
occurring in the political sphere, and the judge’s job is merely to get out of the 
way.  If and only if political majorities have entrenched themselves or warped 
the electoral process should courts intervene in daily affairs.  Ely’s model thus 
operates according to the conception of politics as a game, with the judge as a 
“referee” who steps in only to reset the rules of play “when one team is gaining 
unfair advantage.”214  Although the first notion is better articulated than the 
second, here Ely’s theory and Justice Scalia’s “culture war” imagery take on 
analogous form. 
Both visions share a basic vulnerability.  Fidelity to the Bickelian baseline 
(that is, solicitude for the actions of presently-constituted majorities) renders 
their conceptions of change formalistic and somewhat simplistic.  Taking and 
deciding a constitutional question is fraught with peril for democracy, we are 
told; on the other hand, refusing a case almost always does no damage to the 
bonds of political community. 
If, however, we understand democracy not as a one-day sporting event but 
as the cultivation of a contested set of discursive practices over time, then three 
propositions must follow.  First, courts contribute to constitutional culture 
whether they act or refrain from acting.  It is unavoidable.  Extended non-
action can deprive a democratic counter-culture of the oxygen it needs to 
sustain a reformist drive or to resist an authoritarian impulse.  Because the 
refusal to write law does not occur on a blank canvas, ceding the stage has the 
effect of privileging existing rhetorical forms.  To the extent that such forms 
are used to perpetuate constitutional injustice, juridic silence may allow anti-
democratic discourse to dominate the field of action. 
Second, for the health of deliberative democracy, it is not enough simply to 
 213 See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. 
214 ELY, supra note 18, at 103.  Ely also deploys an antitrust analogy, according to which 
judicial involvement in politics is legitimate when the “political market[] is systematically 
malfunctioning.”  Id.; see also Jonathan Riley, Constitutional Democracy as a Two-Stage 
Game, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 147, 147 (John Ferejohn, Jack 
N. Rakove & Jonathan Riley eds., 2001) (positing a theory of constitution building in which 
the first stage “is a cooperative game in which moral . . . players jointly agree to promote 
their common good” and the second stage “is a noncooperative game in which the veil of 
ignorance is lifted and each moral player freely pursues his particularistic interests”). 
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clear the formal channels for political decision-making.  Open government is a 
necessary condition for democratic constitutionalism, but it is far from 
sufficient.  In addition to political access, a robust constitutional culture 
requires: (a) overlapping claims of authority, from edicts to practices; (b) a 
complex system of political beliefs; and (c) multiple stores of vernacular by 
which to express and nourish such beliefs.  These fonts of self-rule then act in 
mutually reinforcing ways. 
Third, and in closely related fashion, judges are not merely applying ageless 
rules but are also making them; they are not voiceless, but constantly 
screening, modulating, privileging, or supplementing the constructs of other 
members of the democratic community. 
Contrary to Ely’s portrait of self-determination in which politicians do all 
the talking, courts play a central role in the creation of a public ethos.  Judges 
play their part not merely by constraining other actors, but also by cultivating 
the very rhetorical and conceptual tools upon which deliberative democracy 
depends.  It turns out that the judiciary does, indeed it must, reinforce the 
democratic process – just not in the way that Ely himself envisioned. 
D. Dualism’s Blindspot 
Now consider Bruce Ackerman’s sophisticated theory of dualist democracy, 
which not only envisions a two-track understanding of American law, but also 
endorses unconventional procedures for constitutional change through the use 
of “transformative” statutes, judicial appointments, and rulings.215  For the 
dualist, any legitimate change must be sanctified by a political-legal process 
consisting of (1) signaling; (2) proposal; (3) deliberation; and (4) 
codification.216
The explanatory account is a considerable improvement upon the textual-
originalist model because it better captures historical practice.  Resisting the 
impulse to reify text (particularly Article V) to the exclusion of actual practice, 
Ackerman acknowledges the people’s reservation of the ultimate power to 
rewrite their political destiny.  At the same time, however, the creativity in the 
dualist model is somewhat deceiving.  Because dualism’s focus is on the truly 
momentous “constitutional moments,” a number of events are poorly 
accounted for by the model.  More crucially, it denies a judge the rhetorical 
discretion that comes with being a full partner in constitutional lawmaking.  
Ackerman’s self-styled “three-moment theory of constitutional creation”217 
fails to explain changes in political community that may be broad and 
profound, but are neither flashy nor the subject of the four-stage process he 
215 See 1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 52-54. 
216 See id. at 266-67. 
217 Id. at 63-66; see id. at ch. 3 (proposing a “three-solution narrative,” which recognizes 
the role of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal in “creating new higher 
lawmaking processes and substantive solutions in the name of” the people). 
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outlines.218  A good many of the reshapings of the legal imagination cannot be 
traced directly to electoral approval. 
Particularly confounding is the fact that “the marketplace of ideas” has 
revolutionized – some might even say, distorted – the law of the First 
Amendment during the post-war period.  But it is difficult to trace the re-
emergence of laissez-faire jurisprudence to any decisive constitutional 
moment.  The closest is the Reagan-Bush presidencies from 1980 until 1992, 
but Ackerman himself sees the Reagan era as a failed constitutional 
revolution.219  To him, the appointment of Anthony Kennedy and Clarence 
Thomas to the High Court are signs that the country has returned to a period of 
normal politics.220  All of this puts the dualist in a predicament.  Either this 
importation of market ideology into free speech jurisprudence is a vestige of a 
failed revolutionary return to the Lochner era,221 or it represents a successful 
but illegitimate one.222
There remains, of course, another possibility: that dualism does not 
sufficiently encompass the dynamics of constitutional change.  Dualism does 
not recognize transformations in the legal imagination that may be the product 
of paradigm-breaking events, such as civil war or hostilities abroad.  To the 
dualist, these are not singular moments of collective deliberation.  More 
importantly, they cannot properly satisfy the four-fold criteria.223  Dualism 
offers an institutionalist account of legal change that leaves out many 
constitutional actors’ most important contributions to legal context, as well as 
the micro-tools necessary to maintain the people’s hard-won gains. 
Although dualism pencils back in the people’s role in constitutional politics, 
its sketch of the judge’s actual contribution to democratic culture – and her 
relationship to the people – remains parsimonious.  Collectively, the Supreme 
Court Justices serve as a preservationist barometer testing whether a political 
movement has gained broad and deep support.  At most, jurists synthesize 
established principles during previous regimes; nothing more.   Brown is not 
innovative for its reasoning or inspiring in its attempt to provoke a wider 
societal conversation about the depth of the nation’s commitment to racial 
equality; it is a straightforward synthesis of regimes two (Reconstruction’s 
equality principle) and three (New Deal’s activist state) over regime one 
218 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1079-83 (2001) (arguing that the dualism theory works best by looking at 
constitutional history in hindsight, and positing instead a “theory of partisan entrenchment” 
that dispenses with specific “criteria and procedural conditions for constitutional change to 
be legitimate”); see text accompanying note 216. 
219 See 2 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 87, at 389-97.   
220 Id.   
221 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
222 Cf. id. at 390-96.   
223 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 218, at 1079-83. 
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(limited government).224  Likewise, Griswold is not an opening bid to 
reconsider the very preconditions for deliberative democracy, but an instance 
of one-three synthesis.225
We have certainly come a long way from merely denying that judges have 
any part in legal change.  Still, the idealized model of the bound judiciary 
remains potent even in dualist democracy.226  According to dualism, judges 
never initiate conversations, but they do conclude them. 
What have we learned?  The people do make their voices heard, but it is not 
always in a single, brilliant moment.  Constitutional regimes do exist, but they 
are not monolithic and they inspire far more than single principles.  Governing 
paradigms can die dramatic deaths, but most of the time they are eroded and 
supplanted by legal language in bits and pieces over time. 
E. Toward a Decentralized Discursive Model 
To the originalist, the judge is a medium for voices from the past; to the 
dualist, she is a synthesizer of disparate generational interests; to the Elyist, the 
judge is a referee in a high-stakes contest; and to the gradualist, she is a 
nervous innovator.  Each of these accounts of judging – in one way or another 
– minimizes  or distorts the jurist’s contributions to democratic vernacular. 
By comparison, the constructivist judge is an experienced “craftsman with 
verbal skill.”227  Her trade is the reinforcement of democratic design; her 
implements are legal principles and ageless tropes.  The judge builds upon 
earlier models of governance and community, and modifies those vehicles in 
response to changed circumstances. 
A song popularized during the ratification period confirms this 
understanding of the jurist’s role in democratic governance.  According to the 
tune, the Framers and their virtuous compatriots were described as “[l]ads” 
who built a grand new roof for their government.228  Working with local 
materials, each with his own tool and “Plenty of Pins of American Pine,” 
workers first put up the plates, which, “Like the People at large, [were] the 
Ground-work of all.”229  Next to be built was the judiciary: “Our King-Posts 
are Judges – how upright they stand, Supporting the Braces, the Laws of the 
224 1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 133, 142-50; see 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).   
225 Id. at 150-58. 
226 See Robert L. Tsai, Speech and Strife, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 101-03 (2004) 
(discussing the prevalence of the model of the bound judiciary in theories of constitutional 
interpretation). 
227 Paul Ricoeur, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling, in 
ON METAPHOR, supra note 68, at 141, 144 (calling the creator of metaphors a “craftsman 
with verbal skill”); see generally PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR (2003). 
228 Hopkinson, supra note 1, at 169-70. 
229 Id. at 169. 




Although she necessarily sees only part of the landscape of any 
constitutional dispute,231 the judge cultivates the conditions under which other 
actors contest foundational principles and adds to the rhetorical arsenal (i.e., 
the allusions, analogies, and abbreviations useful for constitutional debate).  It 
is in this way that the judge “strengthen[s] the Weak, by weak’ning the 
Strong.”232
















Instead, a decentralized model of constitutional vernacular reveals a more 
complicated set of dialogic relationships: 
 
 
230 Id. at 170.  In architectural terminology, a king post is an essential component of a 
well-built roof.  Standing vertically, it connects a crossbeam to the apex of a triangular truss. 
231 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law? 3 (Harvard Univ., Kennedy 
School of Government Faculty Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP05-013, 2005), 
available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP05-
013/$File/rwp_05_013_schauer.pdf (explaining that cases before judges may not represent 
“the full array of events that the ensuing rule or principle will encompass”). 
232 Hopkinson, supra note 1, at 170 (describing how judges support “the Laws of the 
Land,” which “strengthen the Weak”). 
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Fig. 1.  Classical Model





In contrast with the classical model, the judge-as-“king-post” of the 
democratic order is neither reified nor banished to the margins of American 
constitutional practice. Wielding her explanatory power, the jurist is accorded 
equal footing with other political actors in advancing visions of the democratic 
order.  Similarly, the litigant and activist are not subordinated to the formal 
branches of government, as they are in the classical account. Rather, they are 
treated as creators of constitutional culture in their own right.  Importantly, as 
an “agent[] and trustee[] of the people” each actor claims to speak on behalf of 
their enduring interests.233
IV. ANTICIPATING THE NORMATIVE CRITIQUE 
A skeptic might raise two particular criticisms of the model I have 
sketched.234  First, one might ask: what licenses unelected officials to speak in 
figurative terms?  Let us call this the authorization objection.  In its boldest 
form, it denies the historical legitimacy of poetic devices in judicial discourse.  
Second, one could argue that judicial language and political discourse are in 
fundamental opposition.  On this view, Locke was on to something after all, 
and we ought to limit free-flowing discourse to public officials and forbid 
unelected magistrates from such excursions.  This is the claim of linguistic 
specialization, and it too deserves a reply. 
A complete answer lies beyond the scope of this article.  What I offer here 
are the basic elements of a response, focusing on the judicial function.  The 
emphasis on judges is not an effort to privilege juristic constructions; it is 
233 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 305. 
234 I have elsewhere considered and rejected concerns surrounding intelligibility and 
therefore waste little time rehashing those arguments here.  To summarize, metaphor tends 
to reinforce claims of principle; open networks of meaning as well as close them; and 
stimulate linguistic development.  See Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-
Making, supra note 8, at 186-90 (challenging critics of legal metaphor and explaining the 
central role of metaphor in “the cultivation of constitutional culture”). 
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simply an acknowledgment that the judge’s role requires justification given the 
current state of democratic theory. 
A. Courts as Mediating Institutions 
One could respond to the challenge to judicial innovation by asking what the 
world would look like if judges could only resort to propositional 
argumentation and the matching of cases to facts like so many swatches.  
Would anyone truly wish to scrub the law reporters of all that is fanciful and 
majestic?  Would legal utterances be as memorable?  Energizing?  
Outrageous? 
A stronger defense of rhetorical creativity can yet be mounted: the same 
processes that legitimate juridic elaboration of hard principles similarly 
authorize the inscription of poetic conventions.  Basic changes to the very 
conception of the judicial function were underway as the eighteenth century 
drew to a close.235  Distrust of magistrates began giving way to a collective 
desire for a stronger juristic presence to counterbalance the excesses of popular 
government.236  Gordon Wood explains this intellectual shift: “Redefining 
judges as agents of the sovereign people somehow equal in authority with the 
legislators and executives fundamentally altered the character of the judiciary 
in America.”237  This is reflected in the Federalists’ own ratification strategy, 
which appealed to the people’s own rising interest in a judiciary justified by 
and beholden to no other institution but the people themselves. 
Though motivated by a desire to unravel the plan, Brutus’s description of 
the Judiciary’s complex dialogic role was absolutely spot on – he recognized  
that Article III “give[s] a certain degree of latitude of explanation.”238  Courts 
are authorized to “give such meaning to the constitution as comports best with 
the common, and generally received accepta[nce] of the words in which it is 
expressed, regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their 
235 Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 
202, at 49, 51-53 (describing the shift of public view of judges from skepticism to 
acceptance of judges’ role in democratic governance). 
236 Id. at 52 (explaining that as Americans’ “trust in their democratically elected 
assemblies” eroded during the 1780s, they began to desire a stronger judicial role). 
237 Id. at 54. 
238 “Brutus” XI, The Supreme Court: They Will Mould the Government into Almost any 
Shape They Please, N.Y. JOURNAL, Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 129, 131.  Jack Rakove offers a sympathetic account.  JACK 
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 187 (1996) (concluding that Brutus’s essay “grasped the central thrust of 
Article III as clearly as any Federalist commentator, and his dark musings were no less 
plausible than Madison’s bland assertion of the ‘impartiality’ of federal judges”).  Indeed, 
the Federalists’ defense of judicial review on the grounds of impartiality, superior learning, 
and respect for tradition implicitly acknowledges this very zone of rhetorical freedom.  See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4.  
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grammatical propriety.”239  This zone of rhetorical discretion – which Brutus 
sees more clearly than many contemporary theorists – includes being 
“empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, 
without being confined to the words or letter.”240  Brutus’s comments might 
not have been circulated widely enough to have an impact beyond New York’s 
ratification debate.241  Yet surely it is important that he and others attacked 
Article III precisely because of the judge’s rhetorical freedom, and that they 
failed to convince the citizenry to reject the discretion that is part and parcel of 
the judicial function. 
Brutus could not be more wrong, however, about one thing: magistrates do 
not have the power to “mould the government, into almost any shape they 
please.”242  The fact that legal language is permeable and adaptive does not 
mean one should expect complete pass-through between culture and law.  
Entrenched social traditions, electoral realities, and bureaucratic intransigence 
serve as brakes on the pace and degree of reconstitution.  Publius foresaw that 
courts would act as “mediating” institutions.243  This is true not only in the 
sense that judges must sift through conflicting claims of right advanced in their 
courtrooms.  It is also true in the sense that the democratic voices pressed upon 
the courts in legal briefs and swirling just beyond the courthouse doors are 
modulated and, in many instances, deflected by the Judiciary.  Constitutional 
debate is neither orderly nor linear; rather, it is cacophonous and never-ending.  
Like the Senate, the Judiciary cools the passions of the people by absorbing 
some, but not all, of their mobilized rhetoric. 
For now, I wish to bracket the important question of the degree to which 
jurists should consciously take account of cultural shifts.244  The answer in any 
particular situation will depend upon a host of circumstances, ranging from the 
level of generality of a textual commitment to the degree of social and political 
consensus regarding a particular norm.  This question is different in kind, 
however, from the antecedent matter of whether figurative discourse can be 
normatively justified in the first place.  Still, two preliminary observations are 
in order. 
First, there is little reason to fear that metaphors of juristic origin are any 
more elitist than the substantive principles with which they are paired.  
239 “Brutus” XI, supra note 238, at 131. 
240 Id.  Barry Friedman similarly treats judges both as “speaker[s]” and “facilitator[s]” of 
debate.  Friedman, supra note 12, at 668. 
241 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 81 (2004). 
242 “Brutus” XI, supra note 238, at 135. 
243 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 506 (“[C]ourts 
were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature.”). 
244 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1293-1317 (2005) 
(advocating a pluralism-facilitating model of judicial review). 
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Constitutional language is always an amalgamation of aristocratic and popular 
elements, technical and common modalities.  To the extent that jurists 
comprise primarily a conservatizing force in American politics – drawn from, 
educated alongside, and living among the political elite – we should expect 
their constructions to err on the side of consensus.245
Second, on those occasions when judicial constructions of the democratic 
order conflict sharply with prevailing social norms, subsequent electoral 
dynamics and litigation almost always soften judicial rhetoric.  The Casey 
ruling offers a poignant illustration of this phenomenon, as the most libertarian 
and clinical rhetoric of Roe was modulated, replaced by pointed discussions of 
the value of “potential life” and the “unborn child” counterbalancing a 
woman’s right to self-determination.246
Contrary to the most jurist-phobic accounts, judges do not have the last 
word. Rather, they participate in constitutional dialogue with the other 
branches, where they rarely enjoy the most influential voice.  This insight can 
be made from within the judiciary or from without.  Flights of fancy tend not 
to secure assent within the institution itself; they become the stuff of 
concurrences and dissents.  Thus marginalized, such flourishes are less likely 
to generate support critical to self-regeneration.  Tropes that are too out of 
touch with the times do not become the focal point of constitutional debate, but 
are eschewed by other political actors. 
B. Democracy for All Seasons 
If the claim of rhetorical specialization were to be accepted, one solution 
would be to restrict each constitutional actor to a particular modality.  As the 
argument goes, not only will this strategy permit the proliferation of distinctive 
institutional voices, it will also incentivize orderly dialogue.  While there is 
nothing wrong – and much that is right – with the objective of respecting 
unique discursive practices, the move to quarantine rhetorical creativity in the 
political branches can be neither justified nor accomplished.  The 
specialization strategy rests on two mistaken assumptions.  First, it presumes 
that judicial discourse is fundamentally different from political discourse.  Yet 
while judges speak the language of principle, their dialogic role extends 
245 As my earlier study of First Amendment metaphors revealed, the structure of judicial 
language tended to track popular sentiment rather than lead it.  See Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, 
and Constitutional Myth-Making, supra note 8, at 204-05.  For others who see greater 
continuity between judicial decision-making and political ethos, see Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. 
PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (“[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out 
of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United 
States.”); Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 
63 (2004) (concluding that “majoritarian forces help explain why the Rehnquist Court 
seemed so willing to strike down federal laws”). 
246 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871, 974 (1992). 
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beyond doctrinal tinkering.  The same principles that favor overlapping powers 
and responsibilities similarly favor mutually nourishing pockets of political 
and legal discourse. 
Second, the specialization model wrongly assumes that rules of 
constitutional grammar can be successfully policed.  The thoughtful student of 
language should be highly skeptical of any model of public discourse that 
depends upon strict propriety of usage or a community of the literal-minded.247  
Such accounts tend to privilege official sources – and therefore elite notions of 
order – while discounting the possibility of popular control of legal discourse. 
I do not intend, of course, to deny that legal argumentation takes on certain 
predictable forms.  The subtleties in each type of engagement account for some 
differences in goals and audiences.  Nor do I mean that judges should throw 
caution to the wind and permit artistry to overwhelm statecraft.  Prudence and 
humility remain virtues in doctrinal craftsmanship.  What I hope to underline, 
however, is that constitutional actors – whatever their official title – simply 
cannot help but hear what others say.  These actors naturally engage in 
borrowing and mimicry; linguistic competition between the branches of 
government is therefore the norm rather than the exception.  The forces of 
constitutional politics – the search for credibility and stature, a desire to 
rekindle belief in the rule of law – all impel the Judiciary to behave, at some 
level and in many instances, like other political institutions.  These are the deep 
structural constraints on constitutional language, not the interpretive strategies 
and doctrinal rules used to determine legal outcomes. 
It may be fruitful to juxtapose my conception of foundational meaning-
making from that of another proponent of constitutional construction.  Keith 
Whittington identifies five different levels of constitutional debate: (1) 
policymaking; (2) interpretation; (3) construction; (4) creation; and (5) 
revolution.248  Each of these methods can be distinguished from the others 
along several axes: the relationship to founding text, degree of settlement of 
debate, role of constitutional actor, and consequences of the function.249
At the heart of Whittington’s theory lies a strict dichotomy between 
interpretation (how judges alone may speak) and construction (how political 
actors articulate visions of self-rule).250  Whittington profitably expands the 
tableau of non-juristic forms of constitutional meaning-making, yet he does so 
by unnecessarily impoverishing the judicial function.  To create sufficient 
space for what he calls political constructions, he reduces the range of judicial 
247 Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson make this point more ably than I.  Jack Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1771-1774 (1994) 
(acknowledging that “language is [constantly] undergoing change,” and thus adoption of a 
“strategy of pure description” of language is problematic). 
248 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 3-9 (1999).   
249 See id. at 4. 
250 See id. at 5-6 (contrasting interpretation, a “jurisprudential model,” with construction, 
“a political task”). 
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action to determinate, evolutionary readings of precedent based on legal 
norms.251  Whittington therefore denies judges the authority to construct a 
vision of political community and the imaginative resources to fight for it. 
Yet rhetorical analysis reveals that the difference between interpretation and 
construction is not so great, that they share many structural similarities, and 
that neither modality of debate can be so easily cabined within institutions.  
The vision of political community created by the Court in Lawrence252 is no 
less bracing than the one enunciated by John Jay.253  The constitutive 
synecdoches of judicial handiwork – like those fashioned by political actors – 
remain subject to the test of time.  Each may have its distinctive advantages, 
but the ultimate audience in both situations is the same.  In the court of public 
opinion, each must struggle for survival and primacy. 
None of this is to say that the dialogic roles of judge and elected official are 
identical.  Rather, it is only to recognize that both the jurist and the statesman 
engage in a measure of interpretation and political construction 
simultaneously.  Each act involves a degree of poetic license, appeals to 
enduring political values, and, as even Whittington acknowledges,254 reinforces 
the constitutional order. 
C. In Praise of Dicta 
It might be appropriate to conclude by exploring (albeit briefly) one final 
implication of a more nuanced account of constitutional dialogue.  The thought 
is this: once we have cleared away the debris that denies firm grounding for the 
commonplace and abbreviated, we have arrived at a very different theoretical 
basis for what is often considered to be non-essential legal language. 
The conventional account treats a judicial opinion as a self-contained unit, 
the product of a particular set of claims and dispute.  Dicta, as the term is 
commonly understood, refers to language that is not essential to the “holding” 
of a decision that ends the controversy.255  Within this paradigm, the accepted 
view is that such details are less deserving of deference by later decision-
makers because these features of the law are less likely to be well reasoned or 
251 “Unlike jurisprudential interpretation,” Whittington writes, “construction provides for 
an element of creativity in construing constitutional meaning.”  Id. at 5.  Accordingly, 
Whittington adheres to the classical view that law is the space for reflection, while politics is 
the place for creative action.  Id. at 8. 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 184-189; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
253 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 4.  
254 See supra notes 248-251 and accompanying text. 
255 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949).  Levi argues that  
the common law judge  
is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even in the 
controlling case.  The statement is mere dictum, and this means that the judge in the 
present case may find irrelevant the existence or absence of facts which prior judges 
thought important.
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the product of robust discussion. 
Because every ruling is necessarily incomplete and fashioned through 
compromise,256 however, it is better to think of dicta as accordion-like in 
scope.  Dicta therefore consists of a range of obviously irrelevant details as 
well as many that are ripe for contest in successive conflicts.257  For the gray 
areas, I have in mind not only Justice Powell’s famous disquisition on the 
importance of diversity adopted by the Grutter majority,258 but also the 
trimester framework later excised by the Casey Court as “not . . . part of the 
essential holding of Roe.”259  We tolerate dicta even if we disfavor it because 
doing so is thought to enhance the reasoning function in the long run by 
rendering the majority’s rationale more transparent. 
But even an understanding of dicta broadened along this trajectory – driven 
as it is by a search for rules of decision – does not fully come to grips with the 
subpropositional aspects of constitutional discourse.  For it is in the so-called 
“dicta” of every opinion that judicial vernacular principally lies.  The gripping 
catchphrase, the singular prototype that other actors use to fight over family 
resemblances, and the galvanizing metaphor all range freely in this domain. 
These devices are not so easily relegated to the dustbin of the forgotten and 
the useless; nor do the well-taken assumptions about ordinary dicta ring true.  
These allusions and catchphrases can serve as the basis for vocal 
disagreements about principles; the very fact that dissenters contest the 
majority’s tropes and offer counter-tropes suggest that they are the product of 
deliberate construction.  At the same time, under the traditional dicta model 
these common aspects of constitutional discourse cannot be said to be 
compelled.  The usual dichotomy between essential and non-essential language 
has reached the limit of its utility. 
A judge has at least three possible reasons for pursuing dicta-based tactics: 
256 While it is certainly true that the trial judge seemingly enjoys broad rhetorical 
freedom, the hydraulic pressures of compromise from above exert their sway on even a 
single judge’s product.  Through stare decisis and the desire to avoid being overruled, even 
the trial judge’s rulings will incorporate statements borne of compromise. 
257 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
1065-67 (2005) (developing a definition of dicta that recognizes that “judges . . . often retain 
substantial choice in the means of using cases to make law”); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and 
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (1994) (defending “a view of the holding/dictum 
distinction that attributes special significance to the rationales of prior cases, rather than just 
their facts and outcomes”). 
258 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-325 (2003): 
[C]ourts have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell’s diversity rationale, set forth 
in part of the opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent . . . . 
[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling 
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.  
(referencing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).   
259 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 873 (1992) (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 163-66 (1973)). 
 2006] DEMOCRACY’S HANDMAID 63 
 
 
(1) curbing a momentary majority’s gains (ordinarily by penning a decisive 
concurring opinion); (2) educating future decision-makers; or (3) inspiring 
other political actors to undermine the prevailing juridic vision of democratic 
governance.  If we put aside the obvious desire to influence future members of 
a jurist’s own institution, the rest of these goals are directed at external 
audiences: lower court judges, elected officials, activists, and lawyers.  The 
abundance of regime-building (or regime-undermining) dicta demonstrates that 
every judicial utterance is undeniably a construction of political community. 
Tying these points to our earlier insights, each of these motivations can be 
restated in democracy-promoting terms: (a) slowing or preventing political 
hegemony by a single party or mobilized segment of society; (b) inviting 
institutional interaction; and (c) encouraging future claims on behalf of the 
people.  Thus, we can say that dicta serves deliberative democracy by 
reinforcing the contestability of the law across time.  Dicta represents bits and 
pieces of democratic thought, available for future bouts of political hand-to-
hand and lawyerly issue-framing.  To embrace dicta is to accept that the law, 
like the broader experiment of self-rule, remains a work-in-progress. 
A caveat: my account is not an argument for the unnecessary proliferation of 
judicial opinions any more than it is a license for incoherence within a 
particular ruling.  There is more than a stone’s throw of a difference between a 
theoretical justification for non-doctrinal rhetoric (which I offer) and an 
argument for dicta-based strategies in specific situations (which I do not). 
On the poetic function of the law, Justice Cardozo explains that the jurist 
searches 
[F]or the just word, the happy phrase, that will give expression to the 
thought, but somehow the thought itself is transfigured by the phrase 
when found.  There is emancipation in our very bonds.  The restraints of 
rhyme or metre, the exigencies of period or balance, liberate at times the 
thought which they confine, and in imprisoning release.260
If we forgive his gradualist impulses, what Cardozo describes as the judge’s 
province can equally be claimed by other actors within our order – at least 
when it comes to the everyday and the figurative.  What all of this underscores, 
in the end, is the reciprocal nature of sovereignty’s relationship with popular 
language.  A complex system of beliefs and rhetorical practices ties us closer 
together in the very act of liberating us; it also frees us by illuminating our 
commonalities.  Perhaps we can bring ourselves to praise dicta accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
A credible theory of constitutional vernacular straddles law and politics, 
accounting for sharing between the two fields of action.  It treats poetic devices 
neither as glittering accoutrements to be brushed aside nor as illegitimate 
incursions upon reason’s empire.  Instead, the approach treats them as indices 
260 CARDOZO, supra note 208, at 89. 
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of popular sovereignty.  The model envisions a rich, layered process of 
dialogue in which multiple actors claim to act on behalf of the people.  It holds 
no illusions that some voices will be drowned out, but acknowledges that 
fighting faiths will occasionally become incorporated as features of official 
anthem, doctrine, or law.  Some of these populist features of a living language 
are so infused that they appear to the naked eye to generate action and thought 
of their own volition; others appear to be no more than vestiges of a forgotten 
era. 
Important questions remain.  First, to say that the path of constitutional 
language is legitimately recalibrated through direct action and public litigation 
does not tell us the extent to which law should mirror popular culture or should 
instead manage and reform dominant ways of life.  Direct defiance of valid 
orders can never be countenanced, but short of this drastic situation there is 
much gray area for principle and practice to collide.  The civil rights 
experience is an obvious exemplar of maximum absorption, but the ultimate 
challenge for any comprehensive account is to delineate between 
impermissible cultural domination of law and permissible resistance and 
recalibration of governing norms. 
Second, significant territory remains for exploration of the precise 
combination of rules, bureaucratic superstructure, and linguistic infrastructure 
necessary to renew democratic self-governance. There is a need today for 
American law to be made more responsive to intractable social ills, not less so.  
This instrumental goal is not the primary reason for revisiting dominant 
understandings of foundational dialogue; nor can it be allowed to distort our 
evaluation.  Yet this urgency should make further inquiries into the rich 
interactions between self-rule and ordinary language both timely and relevant. 
Omissions of this nature do not make this account wrong; they merely 
demonstrate that the work of theory remains necessarily unfinished. 
